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The	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  study	  the	  demand	  risk	  of	  those	  SCUTS	  highways	  that	  were	  
renegotiated	   in	   2010	   and	   2011,	   in	  which	   the	   demand	   risk	  was	   fully	   passed	   to	   the	  
public	  sector.	  Is	  the	  State	  carrying	  now	  riskier	  highways,	  regarding	  the	  demand	  risk,	  
comparing	  to	  the	  private	  benchmark	  –	  Brisa?	  The	  2010	  renegotiation	  is	  also	  analysed	  
to	   study	   if	   the	   initial	   demand	   forecast	   errors	   of	   those	   3	   SCUTS	   renegotiated	  were	  
corrected,	   adjusted	   to	   the	   historical	   data	   available	   and	   counted	  with	   the	   negative	  
effect	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  tolls.	  
This	  article,	  using	  the	  model	  proposed,	  compares	  the	  demand	  risk	  of	  the	  ex-­‐SCUTS	  
highways	  with	  the	  private	  benchmark	  highways	  chosen.	  The	  renegotiation	  of	  2010	  is	  
analysed	  through	  the	  study	  of	  the	  previous	  forecast	  errors	  and	  the	  historical	  pattern	  
of	  traffic.	  The	  study	  concludes	  that	  besides	  the	  ex-­‐SCUTS,	   in	  a	  first	  analysis,	  do	  not	  
show	   a	   significantly	   higher	   demand	   risk,	   the	   2010	   renegotiation	   with	   the	  
introduction	   of	   tolls	   highlighted	   some	   questions	   about	   the	   usefulness	   of	   those	  
highways,	   given	   the	   huge	   fall	   in	   the	   volume	   of	   traffic.	   It	   is	   also	   showed	   that	   the	  
renegotiation	   ignored	   the	   historical	   pattern	   of	   traffic,	   the	   forecast	   errors	   already	  
known	   and	   the	   negative	   effect	   of	   tolls,	   and	   projected	   future	   traffics	   very	  
optimistically,	  completely	  misappropriated,	  leading	  to	  a	  great	  burden	  to	  the	  State.	  	  
The	   conclusions	   are	   limited	   by	   the	   short	   data	   and	   because	   of	   the	   comparison	  
between	   highways	   without	   tolls	   (ex-­‐SCUTS)	   with	   the	   benchmark	   highways	   (that	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Public	  Private	  Partnership	  projects	  have	  been	  used	  all	  over	  the	  world,	  registering	  a	  
substantial	  growth	  in	  Portugal.	  The	  PPPs	  appear	  as	  a	  recent	  procurement	  method	  in	  
which	  it	   is	  agreed	  by	  the	  two	  contractors	  to	  share	  the	  risks	  of	  the	  project,	  bring	  its	  
complementary	   skills	   and	   achieve	   higher	   efficiency.	   This	   type	   of	   arrangements	  
between	   the	   public	   and	   the	   private	   sectors	   to	   build	   and	   operate	   capital-­‐intensive	  
projects	   begun	   in	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   and	   have	   proliferated	   through	   many	  
countries.	  In	  Portugal,	  the	  first	  PPP	  contract	  is	  dated	  from	  the	  early	  90’s	  to	  build	  and	  
operate	  the	  Vasco	  da	  Gama	  Bridge,	  which	  links	  the	  two	  riversides	  of	  Rio	  Tejo.	  After	  
all	   this	   time,	  Portugal	   is	  now	   the	   country	   in	   the	  European	  Union	  with	  more	  Public	  
Private	  Partnerships	  relative	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  economy.	  
The	   EC/ECB/IMF	   identified,	   in	   the	   Portuguese	   Memorandum	   of	   Understanding	   of	  
2011,	  the	  PPP	  as	  a	  major	  risk	  to	  the	  fiscal	  consolidation	  that	  Portugal	  has	  to	  follow.	  
In	   fact,	   the	   number	   of	   PPP	   contracts	   in	   Portugal	   has	   grown	   significantly	   in	   these	  
recent	  years,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  consequent	  burden	  to	  the	  public	  accounts.	  From	  2008	  to	  
2011	  it	  was	   launched	  the	  construction	  of	  more	  nine	  PPP	   in	  the	  road	  sector.	  And	  in	  
this	  period	  of	   time,	   the	  net	   charges	   to	   the	   state	  with	  PPP	  more	   than	   tripled,	   from	  
EUR	   475	  millions	   to	   EUR	   1822.6	  millions,	   accounting	   for	   approximately	   1%	   of	   the	  
GDP	  in	  2011	  and	  representing	  a	  slippage	  cost	  of	  18%	  in	  this	  year1.	  	  
The	   biggest	   motivation	   to	   enter	   in	   an	   engagement	   such	   as	   a	   PPP	   contract	   is	   the	  
seeking	  of	  Value	  for	  Money	  (VfM).	  VfM	  is	  the	  cost	  saving	  achieved	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	  project	  is	  conducted	  not	  only	  by	  the	  public	  sector	  but	  also	  by	  the	  private	  sector.	  
It	   is	   attained	   sharing	   the	   risks	   of	   the	   project.	   The	   public	   and	   private	   sectors	  may	  
share	  the	  risks	  based	  on	  which	  of	  them	  is	  best	  placed	  to	  manage	  it.	  Actually,	  this	  is	  
also	  a	  motivation	  to	  increase	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  project.	  First	  of	  all,	  if	  the	  party	  that	  
is	  best	  able	  to	  deal	  with	  some	  risk	  holds	  it,	  is	  expected	  to	  do	  it	  more	  efficiently	  than	  
if	  the	  other	  party	  held	  it.	  The	  risks	  are	  being	  transferred	  from	  the	  public	  party	  to	  the	  
private	   one,	   giving	   a	   financial	   premium	   for	   holding	   that	   risk	   and	  mitigate	   it	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





efficiently.	  However,	  this	  gain	  of	  efficiency	  only	  happens	  until	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  risk	  
transfer,	  where	  VfM	  is	  maximized.	  Then	  forward,	  the	  financial	  premium	  to	  be	  paid	  to	  
the	  private	  sector	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  efficiency	  gain	  of	  transferring	  more	  risks.	  
One	  of	  the	  most	   important	  risks	  to	  take	  care	  about	   in	  a	  PPP	  project	   is	  the	  demand	  
risk.	   Actually,	   some	   authors	   such	   as	   Li,	   Akintoye,	   Edwards,	   &	   Hardcastle	   (2005),	  
Loosemore	  &	  Ng	  (2007),	  Lewis	  (2001),	  consider	  the	  demand	  risk	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  to	  
analyse	   given	   the	   financial	   repercussions	   that	   the	   lack	   of	   demand	   for	   an	  
infrastructure	  facility	  can	  cause.	  
Given	   this,	   our	   study	   focuses	   on	   the	   demand	   risks	   and	   its	   relation	   to	   the	   SCUTS	  
(meaning	  “no	  costs	  for	  the	  user”)	  road	  projects.	  The	  SCUTS	  were	  launched	  with	  the	  
purpose	   of	   develop	   those	   regions	  where	   the	   infrastructure	   gap	  may	   constitute	   an	  
obstacle	   to	   economic	   growth.	   In	   2010	   the	   demand	   risk	   of	   3	   of	   the	   7	   SCUT	  
concessions	   became	   exclusively	   allocated	   in	   the	   public	   sector.	   Later,	   in	   December	  
2011,	   the	   remaining	   4	   SCUTS	   were	   renegotiated	   and	   followed	   the	   same	   path,	  
allocating	   the	   demand	   risk	   to	   the	   public	   sector.	   We	   will	   study	   those	   SCUTS	  
concessions	  regarding	  the	  demand	  risk	  of	  each,	  that	  are	  now	  solely	  supported	  by	  the	  
public	  sector.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  analysis	  is	  to	  study	  whether	  these	  highways,	  whose	  
demand	  risk	  was	  totally	  transferred	  to	  the	  public	  sector,	  show	  the	  same	  risk	  profiles	  
as	  the	  benchmark	  set	  by	  private	  highways	  or	  whether	  the	  demand	  risk	  is	  higher	  and	  
then	  transferring	  it	  to	  the	  public	  sector	  constituted	  a	  bad	  decision.	  This	  analysis	  will	  
be	  made	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  Brisa’s	  highways,	  which	  will	  serve	  as	  benchmark.	  	  
In	   the	   2010	   renegotiation	   of	   the	   SCUT	   contracts,	   the	   demand	   forecasts	   proved	  
themselves	   very	   optimistic,	  well	   above	   the	   real	   traffic	   later	   observed.	   To	   intensify	  
this	   gap,	   the	   economic	   crisis	   exacerbated	   these	   numbers	   and	   time	   after	   time	   we	  
have	   seen	   a	   progressive	   loss	   of	   traffic,	   characterizing	   a	   high	   level	   of	   uncertainty	  
relative	  to	  the	  net	  future	  costs	  for	  the	  Government.	  In	  this	  thesis	  we	  will	  also	  analyse	  
the	  2010	  renegotiation,	  regarding	  the	  traffic	  forecasts	  conducted	  and	  the	  real	  traffic	  
later	  verified.	  
In	  what	  follows,	  our	  study	  is	  organized	  in	  the	  subsequent	  way:	  section	  2	  reviews	  the	  
main	   literature	   regarding	   PPP	   and	   the	   risk	   sharing	   approach	   to	   reach	   Value	   for	  





gives	   a	   brief	   contextualization	   of	   the	   Portuguese	   PPP	   and	   its	   demand	   risk	   sharing	  
structures.	   Section	  4	  describes	   the	  methodology	  used	   to	   study	   the	  demand	   risk	  of	  
each	   highway	   in	   comparison	   to	   Brisa.	   Section	   5	   presents	   the	   main	   results	   of	   the	  
comparison	   of	   the	   predictability	   of	   traffic	   of	   the	   SCUTS	   highways	   and	   Brisa’s	  
highways.	  In	  this	  way,	  this	  topic	  attempts	  to	  address	  a	  comparison	  between	  demand	  
risks	   of	   highways	   in	   which	   the	   demand	   risk	   are	   allocated	   in	   public	   sector	   and	  
highways	   in	   which	   it	   is	   allocated	   in	   private	   sector.	   It	   is	   also	   discussed	   the	   2010	  
renegotiation,	  where	  the	  traffic	  forecasts	  where	  updated	  with	  complete	  divergence	  
with	   the	   historical	   traffic	   verified,	   not	   accounting	   for	   the	   negative	   impact	   of	   the	  
introduction	  of	  tolls	  and	  the	  economic	  crisis	  that	  Portugal	  is	  passing	  through.	  Section	  
6	   presents	   the	   main	   limitations	   of	   the	   study	   and	   section	   7	   retains	   the	   main	  
conclusions.	  
2. Literature	  Review	  
	  
The	  infrastructure	  facilities	  are	  a	  crucial	  issue	  in	  the	  potential	  growth	  of	  an	  economy.	  
In	   these	   last	   decades,	  we	  have	  been	   faced	   in	  many	   countries	  with	  what	   is	   usually	  
called	  an	  “infrastructure	  gap”,	  that	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  what	  the	  government	  
can	   afford	   and	   what	   people	   need	   (Hammami,	   Ruhashyankiko,	   &	   Yehoue,	   2006).	  
Loosemore	  (2007)	  argues	  that	   in	  most	  countries,	  the	  stock	  of	  public	   infrastructures	  
constitutes	  a	  huge	  asset,	  which	  can	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  social,	  cultural	  and	  
economic	   stability,	   productivity,	   development	   and	   prosperity,	   if	   is	   successfully	  
managed.	  This,	   coupled	  with	   the	  budgetary	  constraints	   to	   tackle	   the	   infrastructure	  
gap,	   are	   one	   of	   the	  main	   fundamentals	   for	   the	   growing	   emergence	   of	   the	   Public	  
Private	  Partnerships	  (PPP),	  intensified	  with	  the	  pressure	  to	  reduce	  public	  deficit	  and,	  
at	  the	  same	  time,	  expand	  the	  economy.	  	  
PPP	  are	  seen	  as	  an	  arrangement	  “where	  the	  public	  sector	  bodies	  enter	  into	  a	  long-­‐
term	   contractual	   agreement	   with	   private	   sector	   entities	   for	   the	   construction	   or	  
management	  of	  public	  sector	  infrastructure	  facilities	  by	  the	  private	  sector	  entity,	  or	  
the	  provision	  of	  services	  by	  the	  private	  sector	  entity	  to	  the	  community	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  





in	   the	   formation	  of	   a	   single	   entity,	   created	  by	   the	  private	   consortium,	   just	   for	   the	  
purpose	  of	  the	  contract,	  known	  as	  a	  Special	  Purpose	  Vehicle	  (SPV).	  This	  new	  private	  
entity	   uses	   contracts	   secondary	   to	   the	   concession,	   to	   build,	   operate,	   finance	   and	  
maintain	  the	  infrastructure	  project	  during	  the	  concession	  period	  defined	  (Loosemore	  
&	  Ng,	  2007).	  	  
The	  main	  driver	  to	  enter	  in	  such	  agreements	  is	  to	  achieve	  Value	  for	  Money	  (VfM).	  It	  
can	   be	   attained	  when,	   assuming	   the	   same	   level	   of	   quality	   and	   risk	   allocation,	   the	  
total	  present	  value	  cost	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  supply	  is	  less	  than	  the	  base	  cost	  of	  the	  
service	   if	   it	   was	   provided	   by	   the	   public	   sector	   (Grimsey	   &	   Lewis,	   2005).	   It	   is	   the	  
effective	  use	  of	  public	  funds	  on	  a	  capital	  project,	  which	  can	  arise	  from	  the	  efficient	  
private	  sector	  skills,	  techniques,	  innovations	  and	  practices	  (Saravan,	  2008).	  	  
Moreover,	  since	  the	  traditionally	  borrowing	  cost	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  is	  higher	  than	  
the	  risk	   free	  bond	  of	   the	  public	  sector,	  stating	  that	   the	  private	  sector	  delivers	  VfM	  
means	   that	   in	   all	   other	   stages/processes	   of	   the	   contract	   (construction,	   operation,	  
maintenance,	  etc)	  there	  has	  to	  be	  more	  efficiency	  that	  compensates	  and	  overcomes	  
the	  higher	  financial	  cost.	  As	  the	  private	  sector	  brings	  commercial	  discipline	  to	  public	  
projects,	  the	  risks	  of	  costs	  overruns	  and	  delays	  can	  be	  effectively	  reduced	  (Akintoye,	  
Beck,	   &	   Hardcastle,	   2003).	   A	   more	   productively	   use	   of	   the	   resources	   can	   lead	   to	  
substantial	  improvement	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  public	  facilities	  and	  services	  provided	  
(Edkins	  &	  Smyth,	  2006).	  Besides	  that,	  a	  well-­‐structured	  contract	  gives	  a	  clear	  path	  on	  
accountability,	  and	  gives	  transparency	  in	  the	  outcomes.	  
A	   crucial	   issue	   in	   this	   type	   of	   contracts	   is	   the	   perception	   of	   the	   risks	   involved.	  
Grimsey	  &	  Lewis	  (2002)	  identify	  the	  sharing	  risk	  approach	  as	  a	  crucial	  advantage	  of	  
the	   PPP/PFIs	   projects	   arrangements.	   In	   fact,	   the	  main	   literature	   considers	   the	   risk	  
allocation	  the	  crucial	  driver	  to	  deliver	  VfM.	  It	  allows	  to	  transfer	  risks	  from	  the	  public	  
to	  the	  private	  sector,	  under	  some	  conditions,	   if	   the	  private	  sector	   is	  best	  placed	  to	  
manage	   and	  mitigate	   those	   risks	   and,	   in	   this	  way,	   save	   a	   plenty	   of	   resources	   and	  
reach	   higher	   levels	   of	   efficiency.	   There	   are	   several	   risks	   that	   can	   influence	   the	  
success	   of	   the	   investment,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   usefulness	   of	   the	   infrastructure:	  
construction	   cost,	   changing	  economic	   conditions,	   tax	   and	  expenditures	   limitations,	  





in	   priorities,	   technological	   development	   and	   globalization	   of	   financial	   markets	  
(Saravan,	   2008).	   However,	   Kwak,	   YingYi	   and	   Ibbs	   (2009)	   argue	   that	   there	   is	   not	   a	  
fixed	  list	  of	  risks	  that	  can	  be	  blindly	  applicable	  to	  all	  PPP.	  There	  is	  not	  a	  universally	  
risk	   classification	   to	   apply	   in	   all	   the	   projects.	   Thus,	   some	   authors	   identify	   in	   their	  
works	  some	  lists	  of	  risks	  that	  can	  be	  found	  in	  some	  projects.	  Tinsley	  (2001)	  identifies	  
a	   list	  of	  risk	  categories	  as	  well	  as	  Hardcastle	   (2003),	  who	  defines	  each	  risk.	  Chinyio	  
(2003)	   recognize	   some	   techniques	   to	   identify	   risks	   and	   prioritize	   them.	   Based	   on	  
Panel	  (1995),	  Gallimore	  (1997),	  Birnie	  (1999)	  and	  Salzmann	  (1999),	  Akintoye	  (2001)	  
identify	   a	   range	   of	   risks	   presented	   in	   those	   papers.	   Centred	   on	   infrastructure	  
projects,	   also	   Grimsey	   and	   Lewis	   (2004)	   classify	   some	   risks	   faced	   in	   this	   type	   of	  
engagements.	  	  
The	   accomplishment	   of	   the	   partnership	   highly	   depends	   on	   the	   proper	   risk	  
identification	  of	  the	  project,	  which	  with	  a	  precise	  documentation	  should	  be	  shared	  
between	  the	  public	  and	  the	  private	  sector.	  Shen	  et	  al	   (2006)	  argue	  that	   large	  scale	  
public	  works,	  as	  those	  used	  in	  the	  PPP’	  contracts,	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  risky	  than	  other	  
business	   activities	   due	   to	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   coordination	   of	   a	   wide	   range	   of	  
different	  skills	  and	  activities.	  Thus,	  the	  question	  of	  risk	  appears	  as	  a	  central	  concern	  
when	   discussing	   the	   implementation	   of	   a	   PPP	   contract	   because	   it	   may	   imply	  
unexpected	   consequences	   in	   the	   future.	   In	   fact,	   to	   ensure	   the	   success	   of	   PPP	  
infrastructures	  projects	  and	  reach	  VfM,	  risks	  should	  be	  shared.	  	  
The	  allocation	  of	  risk	  constitutes	  an	  important	  incentive	  to	  increase	  efficiency.	  If	  the	  
private	  party	  shows	  better	  performance	  in	  mitigating	  some	  risk	  than	  the	  public	  one,	  
it	   should	   hold	   it.	   Becker	   and	   Patterson	   point	   that	   there	   is	   a	   strong	   correlation	  
between	  risks	  and	  rewards.	  Since	  the	  private	  sector	  can	  mitigate	  it	  more	  efficiently,	  
the	  public	  sector	  should	  transfer	  risks	  to	  the	  private	  party,	  leading	  to	  a	  higher	  level	  
of	  efficiency,	  and	  rewarding	  it	  for	  the	  assumption	  of	  more	  risks.	  The	  risks	  should	  be	  
transferred	  until	  the	  point	  were	  the	  efficiency	  gain	  of	  transfer	  more	  risks	  is	  less	  than	  
the	   financial	   premium	   that	   have	   to	   be	   paid	   to	   the	   private	   party.	   In	   that	   point	   the	  
optimal	   allocation	  of	   risks	   is	   achieved	  and	  VfM	   is	  maximized.	   Thus,	   if	   the	   risks	   are	  
well	  recognized	  and	  balanced	  VfM	  can	  be	  maximized.	  However,	  this	  optimal	  balance	  





Based	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Zou,	  Wang,	  &	  Fang	  (2008),	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  among	  all	  of	  
those	  risks,	  the	  demand	  risk	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  risks	  that	  may	  have	  higher	  
repercussions	  on	  the	  returns	  and	  successfulness	  of	  the	  investment.	  In	  fact,	  when	  we	  
are	  referring	  to	  PPP	  contracts	  in	  roads,	  the	  demand	  and	  the	  traffic	  forecast	  become	  
a	  critical	  aspect	  to	  take	  into	  account.	  The	  possibility	  of	  insufficient	  traffic	  volume	  and	  
the	   alternative	   roads	   to	   do	   the	   same	   route	   might	   affect	   the	   revenues	   and	  
consequent	   income	   of	   the	   project.	   At	   the	   feasibility	   stage,	   there	   must	   be	   a	  
simulation	   to	   assess	   if	   there	   is	   sufficient	   traffic	   volume,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  optimal	   toll	  
price	  for	  the	  road	  (Zou,	  Wang,	  &	  Fang,	  2008).	  Despite	  table	  1,	  which	  shows	  the	  main	  
conclusions	  of	   the	  mentioned	  authors	   regarding	   the	  allocation	  of	  demand	   risk,	  we	  
found	   that	   there	   is	   not	   complete	   consensus	   concerning	  whether	   the	   demand	   risk	  
should	  be	  allocated	  to	  the	  public	  or	  the	  private	  sector.	  	  
Table	  1:	  Demand	  risk	  allocation	  in	  the	  main	  literature	  
The	  author	  column	  identifies	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  papers	  mentioned.	  Columns	  Country	  and	  PPP	  identify	  
the	  country	  and	  the	  sector	  of	  the	  analysed	  PPP.	  Allocation	  pretends	  to	  identify	  to	  which	  part	  (public,	  
private	   or	   shared)	   were	   the	   risk	   demand	   allocated.	   Conclusions	   give	   the	   main	   conclusions	   of	   the	  
referred	  case	  studies.	  





UK	   Generic	   Private	  
• Government	   should	  adopt	  economic	  policies	  
to	  maintain	  favourable	  economic	  conditions.	  
• Private	  sector	  should	  bore	  the	  demand	  risk.	  
Loosemore	  &	  
Ng	  (2007)	  
Australia	   Railway	   Private	  
• The	   SPV	   took	   the	   risk	   of	   operating	   trains,	  
selling	   tickets	   and	   meeting	   agreed	   service	  
standards.	  
• The	   SPV	   went	   bankruptcy	   and	   began	   to	   be	  
heavily	   compensated	   for	   the	   differences	   in	  
the	  real	  and	  forecasted	  demand.	  
Wang,	  Tiong,	  






• Demand	   risk	   is	   borne	   by	   the	   private	   sector	  
and	  the	  tariffs	  are	  subject	  to	  annual	  review	  in	  
accordance	   with	   the	   formulas	   previously	  
agreed.	  
Lewis	  (2001)	   Generic	   Generic	   Private	   • The	   project	   company/investors	   should	   bear	  
the	  risk	  of	  decreased	  demand.	  
Arndt	  (1998)	   Australia	   Road	   Shared	  
• The	  traffic	  models	  are	  maintained	  updated	  
throughout	  the	  life	  of	  the	  project	  to	  revise	  
the	  situation	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  base	  case.	  
• The	  State	  adopts	  traffic	  management	  
measures	  in	  the	  surrounding	  road	  network	  
and	  compensates	  the	  private	  if	  the	  measures	  
are	  not	  initiated	  in	  certain	  date.	  The	  private	  
pays	  to	  the	  State	  50%	  of	  the	  additional	  
benefits	  of	  that	  measures.	  






Li	  et	  al	  (2005)	  argue	  that	  in	  theory,	  allocating	  a	  specific	  risk	  to	  the	  party	  best	  able	  to	  
manage	  it	  will	  reduce	  the	  individual	  risk	  premium	  and	  so	  it	  should	  be	  able	  to	  do	  it	  at	  
a	   lowest	   price.	   Consequently	   demand	   risk	   should	   be	   allocated	   to	   the	   private	  
consortium	  while	   the	   governments	   should	   adopt	   policies	   to	   guarantee	   the	  macro-­‐
economic	  stability,	  maintaining	  a	  growing	  economic	  environment	  and	  supporting	  a	  
reasonable	  certainty	  and	  confidence	  in	  the	  market.	  
However,	  Loosemore	  (2007)	  argues	  that	  recent	  research	   indicated	  that	  even	  in	  the	  
largest	   PPP	   projects	   the	   risk	   management	   practices	   are	   highly	   variable,	   intuitive	  
unsophisticated	   and	   subjective.	   Many	   times	   those	   demand	   risks	   are	   not	   well	  
assessed	  and	  even	  with	  high	  uncertainty	  related	  to	  the	  expected	  traffic	  volume	  and	  
to	   the	   real	   need	   of	   that	   investment,	   the	   contracts	   are	   signed.	   Zou	   et	   al	   (2008)	  
identifies	  that	  usually	  the	  public	  sector	  is	  more	  concerned	  in	  achieving	  a	  social	  goal,	  
highly	   correlated	  with	   their	   political	   standing	   and	   influence,	   than	   ensuring	   a	   good	  
investment	   and	   a	   reasonable	   share	   of	   risks,	   to	   obtain	   the	   desired	   return	   for	   the	  
country.	  Chan,	   Lam,	  Chan,	  &	  Cheung	   (2008)	   stresses	   the	   case	   study	  of	   the	   Sydney	  
Cross	   City	   Tunnel,	   an	   infrastructure	   designed	   to	   ease	   the	   traffic	   congestion	   in	   the	  
central	  business	  district	  of	  Sydney	  and	   to	   improve	   the	  east	   to	  west	   traffic	   flows.	   It	  
was	   decided	   to	   allocate	   all	   the	   demand	   risk	   to	   the	   private	   sector,	   based	   on	   the	  
forecasts	   made	   by	   the	   government.	   It	   was	   designed	   based	   on	   very	   optimistic	  
demand	  forecast.	  The	  expected	  traffic	  revealed	  well	  disappropriated	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  
toll	   revenues	   was	   the	   main	   cause	   for	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   project	   company.	   This	  
example	  gives	  an	   insight	   for	   the	   importance	  of	  having	  a	  clear	  and	  precise	  demand	  
forecast	  as	  well	  as	  a	  realistic	  analysis	  of	  the	  need	  of	  the	  investment	  when	  it	  is	  in	  the	  
study	   phase	   of	   the	   project.	   In	   fact,	   the	   objective	   of	   the	   projects	   is	   to	   efficiently	  
satisfy	   the	  demand	  that	  those	   infrastructures	  will	  have.	  The	  revenue	  and	  the	  State	  
payments	   (in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   SCUTS)	   will	   depend	   and	   be	   projected	   through	   that	  
demand.	  So,	  it	  is	  of	  extreme	  importance	  to	  have,	  as	  possible,	  an	  accurate	  forecast	  of	  
what	  will	  be	  the	  demand	  and	  a	  study	  of	  how	  is	  its	  behaviour	  given	  variations	  over	  its	  
fundamentals.	  
In	  what	  concerns	  to	  the	  study	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  road	  traffic	  demand,	  Graham	  &	  





determinants	  of	   the	  variation	  of	   the	   road	  traffic.	  Actually,	   they	  state	   that	   the	   road	  
traffic	   is	   highly	   elastic	   with	   respect	   to	   generalized	   cost	   of	   driving,	   where	   the	   fuel	  
price	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role.	  The	  immediate	  response	  of	  an	  increase	  in	  fuel	  prices	  is	  the	  
change	  of	  some	  decisions	  like	  modifying	  the	  number	  of	  trips.	  In	  the	  long	  run,	  it	  leads	  
to	   a	   change	   in	   behaviour:	   people	  make	   adaptations,	   changing	   distances	   travelled,	  
destinations	   chosen;	   there	   are	   a	   relocation	   of	   population	   and	   retail	   and	   services	  
activities	  (De	  Jong	  &	  Gunn,	  2001).	  Brain	  (2009)	  identifies	  the	  recent	  macroeconomic	  
downturn	  in	  Portugal	  as	  a	  major	  cause	  of	  the	  progressive	  loss	  of	  traffic	  verified.	  The	  
author	  highlights	  that	  recessions	  or	  economic	  downturns	  was	  referred	  in	  a	  number	  
of	   cases,	   emphasizing	   the	   positive	   relation	   between	   economic	   growth	   and	   traffic	  
growth.	  Moreover,	   the	   introduction	  of	   tolls	   and	   the	   consumer’s	  willingness	   to	  pay	  
them	  is	  also	  an	  important	  variable	  that	  influences	  the	  road	  traffic	  demand.	  
3. A	  brief	  consideration	  of	  the	  Portuguese	  context	  
	  
The	   first	   Portuguese	   PPP	   contract	   is	   dated	   from	   1993	   with	   the	   Vasco	   da	   Gama	  
Bridge,	   in	   Lisbon.	   Since	   then	   more	   352	   significant	   PPP	   arrangements	   have	   been	  
launched	  making	   Portugal	   the	   European	   country	   with	   the	   highest	   investment	   per	  
capita	  in	  PPP.	  These	  investments	  represent	  an	  expected	  NPV	  of	  net	  costs	  of	  EUR	  10	  
703	   millions2	  from	   2011	   to	   2040.	   The	   structure	   of	   these	   partnerships	   is	   divided	  
through	   the	   road	   sector	   (79%),	   rail	   sector	   (18%),	   health	   sector	   (2%)	   and	   security	  
(1%)2.	  	  
The	   allocation	   of	   the	   demand	   risk	   in	   the	   Portuguese	   Public	   Private	   Partnerships	  
differs	   depending	  on	   the	  partnership.	   Table	   2	   identifies	   the	  model	   of	   demand	   risk	  
sharing	  in	  the	  most	  significant	  PPP.	  As	  we	  can	  observe	  the	  allocation	  of	  the	  demand	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







Table	  2:	  Actual	  demand	  risk	  allocation	  in	  the	  most	  significant	  Portuguese	  PPP	  
This	  table	  identifies	  the	  most	  significant	  Portuguese	  PPP,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  sector	  and	  the	  allocation	  of	  its	  
demand	  risk.	  
	  	   PPP	   	  	   Sector	   Public	   Shared	   Private	  





Concession	  SCUT	  Algarve	  (Via	  do	  Infante)	   	  	   Road	   X	   	  	   	  	  
Concession	  SCUT	  Beira	  Interior	   	  	   	  	   Road	   X	   	  	   	  	  
Concession	  SCUT	  Costa	  de	  Prata	   	  	   Road	   X	   	  	   	  	  
Concession	  SCUT	  Grande	  Porto	   	  	   	  	   Road	   X	   	  	   	  	  
Concession	  SCUT	  Norte	  Litoral	   	  	   	  	   Road	   X	   	  	   	  	  
Concession	  SCUT	  Beiras	  Litoral	  e	  Alta	   	  	   Road	   X	   	  	   	  	  








Concession	  Lusoponte	   	  	   	  	   Road	   	  	   	  	   X	  
Concession	  Norte	   	  	   	  	   Road	   X	   	  	   	  	  
Concession	  Oeste	   	  	   	  	   Road	   	  	   	  	   X	  
Concession	  Brisa	   	  	   	  	   Road	   	  	   	  	   X	  
Concession	  Litoral	  Centro	   	  	   	  	   Road	   	  	   	  	   X	  
Concession	  Grande	  Lisboa	   	  	   	  	   Road	   X	   	  	   	  	  
Concession	  Douro	  Litoral	   	  	   	  	   Road	   	  	   	  	   X	  
Sub-­‐concession	  AE	  Transmontana	   	  	   Road	   	  	   	  	   X	  
Sub-­‐concession	  Douro	  Interior	   	  	   	  	   Road	   	  	   	  	   X	  
Concession	  Tunel	  do	  Marão	   	  	   	  	   Road	   X	   	  	   	  	  
Sub-­‐concession	  Baixo	  Alentejo	   	  	   	  	   Road	   	  	   	  	   X	  
Sub-­‐concession	  Baixo	  Tejo	   	  	   	  	   Road	   	  	   	  	   X	  
Sub-­‐concession	  Litoral	  Oeste	   	  	   	  	   Road	   	  	   	  	   X	  
Sub-­‐concession	  Algarve	  Litoral	   	  	   	  	   Road	   	  	   	  	   X	  
Sub-­‐concession	  Pinhal	  Interior	   	  	   	  	   Road	   	  	   	  	   X	  
Metro	  Sul	  Tejo	   	  	   	  	   	  	   Rail	   X	   	  	   	  	  
Transp.	  Ferroviário	  eixo-­‐norte/sul	   	  	   Rail	   	  	   	  	   X	  
Gestão	  H.	  Braga	  -­‐	  Ent.	  Gest.	  do	  Estabelecimento	   Health	   	  	   X	   	  	  
Gestão	  H.	  Cascais	  -­‐	  Ent.	  Gest.	  Estabelecimento	   Health	   	  	   X	   	  	  
Gestão	  H.	  Loures	  -­‐	  Ent.	  Gest.	  Estabelecimento	   Health	   	  	   X	   	  	  
Gestão	  H.	  V.	  Franca	  -­‐	  Ent.	  Gest.	  Estabelecim.	   Health	   	  	   X	   	  	  
SIRESP	   	  	   	  	   	  	   Security	   X	   	  	   	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  Direcção-­‐Geral	  do	  Tesouro	  e	  Finanças	  (2011).	  Parcerias	  Público-­‐Privadas	  e	  Concessões	  –	  Relatório	  de	  2011.	  
In	  the	  road	  sector	  stands	  out	  the	  SCUT	  (“sem	  custos	  para	  o	  utilizador”,	  which	  means	  
“no	  costs	  for	  the	  user”)	  highway	  projects,	  in	  which	  we	  will	  focus	  our	  study.	  The	  SCUT	  
Public	  Private	  Partnerships	  were	  primarily	  composed	  by:	  
• Concession	  SCUT	  do	  Algarve;	  
• Concession	  SCUT	  da	  Beira	  Interior;	  
• Concession	  SCUT	  Costa	  de	  Prata;	  
• Concession	  SCUT	  Grande	  Porto;	  
• Concession	  SCUT	  Norte	  Litoral;	  





• Concession	  SCUT	  Interior	  Norte;	  
These	  SCUT	  projects	  correspond	  to	  930	  km	  of	  highways	  with	  a	  shadow	  toll	  payment,	  
in	   which	   the	   state	   budget	   pays	   the	   private	   consortium	   for	   the	   utilization	   of	   the	  
roads.	  This	  type	  of	  contracts	  was	  made	  for	  the	  purpose	  that	  it	  would	  develop	  those	  
repressed	   regions	   that	   were	   somehow	   isolated	   and	   in	   this	   way	   fight	   the	   lack	   of	  
infrastructure	   that	   may	   constitute	   an	   obstacle	   to	   development	   and	   investment	  
attraction.	   However,	   the	   2003	   audit	   to	   the	   SCUT	   PPP,	   made	   by	   the	   Tribunal	   de	  
Contas	   (Court	  of	  Audit	  of	  Portugal)	   indicated	   that	   the	  main	  driver	  of	   the	   launch	  of	  
this	  SCUT	  program	  was	  the	  advantage	  to	  transfer	  the	  financial	  effort	  to	  the	  private	  
sector	  rather	  than	  the	  possible	  value	  added	  that	  the	  investment	  would	  bring	  to	  the	  
public	   purse.	   This,	   coupled	   with	   the	   lack	   of	   experience	   and	   a	   not	   so	   clear	   legal	  
framework,	   until	   2003,	   regarding	   the	   Public	   Private	   Partnerships,	   led	   to	   some	  
questionable	  decisions	  in	  this	  area.	  
Until	  2010,	  the	  state	  budget	  paid	  annually	  for	  the	  use	  of	  the	  highways,	  rather	  than	  
charging	  the	  users.	  The	  payment	  was	  made	  through	  three	  bands,	  the	  inferior	  band,	  
the	  reference	  band	  and	  the	  superior	  band.	  	  
1. Inferior	  band:	  it	  was	  paid	   x 	  per	  vehicle	  per	  kilometer	  for	  the	  first	  vehicles	  of	  
the	  day	  (filling	  in	  the	  first	  band).	  
2. Reference	  band:	  it	  was	  paid	   y 	  (with	   y < x )	  per	  vehicle	  per	  kilometer	  for	  the	  
next	  vehicles	  (filling	  in	  the	  second	  band).	  
3. Superior	  band:	  for	  all	  vehicles	  per	  kilometer	  higher,	  it	  had	  no	  payment.	  
This	  inverse	  relation	  had	  the	  objective	  of	  marking	  out	  the	  risks	  taken	  by	  each	  part.	  In	  
the	  superior	  band	  the	  State	  budget	  pays	  “zero”	  for	  what	  exceeds	  the	  upper	  bound	  of	  
the	   band	   and	   in	   the	   inferior	   band	   there	   is	   a	  minimum	   revenue/traffic	   guaranteed	  
paid	   to	   the	   private	   sector.	   So,	   the	   private	   sector	   is,	   in	   this	   type	  of	   payments,	   also	  
exposed	   to	   the	  demand	  risk.	  However,	   the	  assumption	  of	   risk	  by	   the	  private	  party	  
only	  takes	  place	  if	  the	  alternative	  roads	  to	  the	  highway	  are	  only	  those	  present	  on	  the	  





	   Table	  3:	  Demand	  risk	  allocation	  in	  SCUTS	  before	  and	  after	  renegotiation	  
This	  table	  identifies	  the	  initial	  7	  SCUTS	  concessions	  and	  its	  risk	  sharing	  model	  before	  and	  after	  its	  
renegotiations	  in	  2010	  and	  2011.	  
SCUT	   Initial	  project	   	  	   After	  renegotiation	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   Year	   	  	  
Concession	  SCUT	  Algarve	   Shared	   	  	   2011	   Public	  
Concession	  SCUT	  Beira	  Interior	   Shared	   	  	   2011	   Public	  
Concession	  SCUT	  Costa	  de	  Prata	   Shared	   	  	   2010	   Public	  
Concession	  SCUT	  Grande	  Porto	   Shared	   	  	   2010	   Public	  
Concession	  SCUT	  Norte	  Litoral	   Shared	   	  	   2010	   Public	  
Concession	  SCUT	  Beiras	  Litoral	  e	  Alta	   Shared	   	  	   2011	   Public	  
Concession	  SCUT	  Interior	  Norte	   Shared	   	  	   2011	   Public	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  Direcção-­‐Geral	  do	  Tesouro	  e	  Finanças	  (2011).	  Parcerias	  Público-­‐Privadas	  e	  Concessões	  –	  Relatório	  de	  2011.	  
	  
	  
In	   2010,	   the	   Portuguese	   government	   renegotiated	   3	   SCUT	   contracts.	   In	   this	  
renegotiation	  the	  payment	  method	  of	  the	  concession	  of	  Costa	  de	  Prata,	  Norte	  Litoral	  
and	   Grande	   Porto	   changed	   from	   payment	   by	   bands	   of	   traffic	   to	   payments	   for	  
availability.	   Real	   tolls	   were	   installed,	   whose	   the	   revenue	   accrue	   to	   Estradas	   de	  
Portugal	   (Portuguese	   state	   owned	   entity,	   responsible	   for	   the	  management	   of	   the	  
national	  road	  grid).	  As	  counterpart,	  the	  consortium	  is	  paid	  for	  the	  availability	  of	  the	  
road	  networks	  and	   the	   service	  of	   toll	   collection,	  and	   this	  payment	   is	  based	  on	   the	  
traffic	   forecasts	   present	   in	   the	   Base	   Case	   of	   each	   concession,	   which	   in	   fact	   have	  
proved	  to	  be	  very	  optimistic	  (analysis	  that	  will	  be	  addressed	  more	  carefully	  in	  section	  
5.3).	   The	   demand	   risk	   became,	   in	   this	   way,	   entirely	   under	   the	   public	   sector	  
responsibility,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   deviations	   of	   traffic	   volume	   will	   only	   affect	   the	  
revenue	  to	  the	  state	  budget.	  
December	  of	  2011	  marked	  the	  extinction	  of	  the	  SCUT	  projects	  as	  highways	  with	  no	  
costs	   for	   the	   users,	   in	   Portugal.	   The	  Government	   decided	   to	   implement	   the	   same	  
scheme	  in	  the	  remaining	  SCUTS,	  leaving	  the	  payment	  by	  bands	  and	  introducing	  the	  
payment	  by	  availability,	  with	  the	  toll	  revenues	  reverting	  to	  Estradas	  de	  Portugal.	  	  
These	   renegotiations	   and	   the	   consequent	   change	   in	   the	  methodology	   of	   payment	  
led	  to	  significant	  controversial	  questions	  regarding	  whether	  the	  public	  interests	  were	  
preserved	   and	   put	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   Actually,	   the	   demand	   risk	   changed	   from	   a	  
shared	   scheme	   to	   a	   public	   allocation.	   In	   the	  method	   of	   payments	   by	   bands	   both	  
public	  and	  private	  sectors	  should	  bore	  the	  risk	  of	  demand	  (although,	  in	  practice,	  the	  





private	   supported	   the	   risk	   of	   having	   extremely	   high	   demand	   –	   which	   did	   not	  
happened).	   This	   new	   approach	   of	   payment	   by	   availability	   led	   the	   public	   sector	   to	  
bear	   all	   the	   demand	   risk.	   Since	   the	   private	   sector	  will	   always	   receive	   the	   revenue	  
corresponding	  in	  the	  Base	  Case,	  that	  were	  calculated	  considering	  the	  forecasts,	  the	  
risk	  of	  having	  lower	  traffic	  volumes	  is	  all	  carried	  by	  the	  public	  purse.	  Moreover,	  since	  
the	  highways	  adopted	  tolls,	  as	  it	  was	  expected,	  the	  traffic	  volume	  fell.	  This	  can	  lead	  
us	   to	   question	   whether	   the	   change	   from	   payment	   by	   bands	   to	   payment	   for	  
availability	  was	  favourable	  to	  the	  public	  purse	  since	  it	  changed	  from	  a	  method	  were,	  
in	  principle,	  the	  two	  parties	  shared	  the	  possible	   lack	  of	  traffic	  to	  a	  model	  were	  the	  
public	   sector	   borne	   the	   risk	  which	   is	   significantly	   higher	   given	   the	   introduction	   of	  
tolls,	   while	   the	   private	   sector	   receives	   the	   revenues	   corresponding	   to	   the	   traffic	  








Given	   the	   literature	   considered	   in	   this	   area,	  we	  will	   study	   the	  development	  of	   the	  
traffic	   demand	   in	   the	   Portuguese	   SCUTS	   regarding	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   economic	  
activity	  and	  the	   fuel	  prices.	  Since	  the	  traffic	   for	  data	   is	  given	   in	  a	  monthly	  basis	  by	  
the	  average	  daily	  monthly	  Traffic	  (ADMT)	  and	  given	  that	  the	  data	  for	  the	  gdp	  growth	  
are	  only	  available	  in	  a	  quarter	  basis,	  we	  decide	  to	  use	  the	  leading	  indicator	  of	  Banco	  
de	   Portugal	   “indicador	   coincidente	   de	   actividade	   económica”3,	   that	   is	   published	  
every	  month,	  as	  proxy	  of	  the	  gdp	  year	  on	  year	  monthly	  growth.	  
It	   seems	   reasonable	   that	   the	   effect	   of	   gdp	   growth	   on	   the	   traffic	   demand	   will	   be	  
different	  from	  highway	  to	  highway	  due	  to	  different	  characteristics	  of	  the	  areas	  that	  
those	   highways	   serve.	   For	   instance,	   it	   appears	   to	   be	   relevant	   to	   consider	   that	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The	  “indicador	  coincidente	  da	  actividade	  económica”	  is	  a	  leading	  indicator	  developed	  by	  Banco	  de	  Portugal,	  
which	  is	  used	  to	  evaluate	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  economic	  activity	  of	  Portugal	  and	  have	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  precise	  





areas	   with	   a	   lower	   population	   density,	   where	   in	   principle	   there	   are	   not	   so	   much	  
economic	  activity,	  the	  effect	  of	  gdp	  growth	  on	  traffic	  will	  not	  be	  so	  substantial	  as	  it	  is	  
in	   areas	  with	   high	   concentration	   of	   population	   and	   services.	   So,	  we	   constructed	   a	  
variable	  to	  interact	  with	  the	  growth	  of	  gdp,	  that	  we	  call	  coefficient	  of	  urbanism.	  This	  
variable	  weights	  each	  highway	  by	   the	  population	  density	  of	  each	  part	  of	   its	   route.	  
The	  weighted	  variable	  takes	  values	  of	  1	  for	  counties	  with	  less	  than	  20000	  habitants,	  
2	  for	  counties	  with	  population	  between	  20000	  and	  100000	  and	  3	  for	  counties	  with	  
more	  than	  100000	  people.	  For	  each	  highway	  we	  computed	  a	  weighted	  variable	  that	  
weights	  each	  section	  and	  subsection	  of	  the	  highway	  by	  its	  population	  density	  ending	  
up	  in	  a	  specific	  weight	  per	  highway.	  	  
Portugal	  is	  a	  country	  that	  benefits	  from	  a	  good	  climate.	  In	  2010	  the	  “consumption”	  
of	  tourism	  accounted	  for	  9.2%	  of	  the	  gdp4.	  According	  to	  Proença	  &	  Soukiazis	  (2005),	  
Spain,	  Germany,	  France	  and	  U.K.	  are	  responsible	  for	  almost	  90%	  of	  the	  total	  inflows	  
of	   tourists	   in	   Portugal.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   foreign	   tourists,	   also	   the	   Portuguese	  
emigrants	  have	  an	   important	   role	   in	   the	  tourism	  of	  Portugal,	   returning	  back	   in	   the	  
holiday	  months.	  Given	  the	  importance	  of	  tourism	  in	  Portugal	  and	  that	  it	  presents	  a	  
seasonality	  rate	  of	  40%5,	  it	  seems	  logical	  to	  consider	  introducing	  in	  the	  analysis	  the	  
dummy	  variable	  summer,	  that	  will	  take	  value	  1	  for	  July,	  August	  and	  September	  and	  0	  
otherwise.	   It	   will	   explain	   some	   variability	   of	   the	   volume	   of	   traffic	   in	   the	   summer	  
months	   that	   are	   highly	   significant	   given	   the	   influx	   of	   tourists,	   emigrants	   and	   the	  
natural	  predisposition	  of	  people	  to	  travel	  in	  this	  season.	  
A	  dummy	  for	  toll	  is	  also	  considered	  to	  capture	  the	  effect	  of	  this	  method	  of	  payment	  
on	  traffic.	  The	  dummy	  will	  take	  value	  1	  for	  time	  periods	  after	  October	  2010	  for	  the	  
concessions	  Costa	  de	  Prata,	  Norte	  Litoral	  and	  Grande	  Porto,	  and	  in	  January	  2011	  for	  






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  According	  to	  Turismo	  de	  Portugal,	  Report	  of	  Sustainability	  (2010).	  





4.1.2.	  Determinants	  of	  traffic	  
	  
We	  will	  perform	  a	  panel	  data	  regression,	  using	  the	  fixed	  effects	  model6,	  to	  show	  that	  
the	  variables	  pointed	  by	  the	  literature	  are	  significant	  and	  apply	  to	  Portugal.	  
In	  this	  way,	  the	  model	  considered	  is	  the	  following:	  
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐!,! =∝!+ 𝛽!𝑔𝑑𝑝! ∗ 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡! + 𝛽!𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙! + 𝜃!𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑙!,! + 𝜃!𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟! + 𝜀!,!.	  
	  
4.1.3.	  The	  measure	  of	  demand	  risk	  on	  each	  concession	  
	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  clarify	  our	  definition	  of	  traffic	  and	  demand	  risk.	  By	  traffic	  we	  intend	  
to	  refer	  to	  the	  average	  number	  of	  cars	  that	  crosses	  some	  highway	  in	  a	  determined	  
month.	  The	  traffic	  data	  available	  is	  in	  average	  daily	  monthly	  basis	  (ADMT),	  which	  is	  
calculated	  by	  averaging	  the	  daily	  number	  of	  cars	  that	  crosses	  a	  highway	  in	  a	  month.	  
ADAT	  (average	  daily	  annual	  traffic),	  which	  will	  use	  in	  the	  last	  section	  to	  analyse	  the	  
renegotiation	  of	  2010,	  refers	  to	  the	  average	  of	  the	  ADMTs	  in	  a	  year.	  
The	  demand	  risk	  will	  be	  given	  by	  the	  (1-­‐R2)	  of	  each	  regression	  of	  each	  highway.	  The	  
reasoning	   is	   the	   following:	  given	  that	   the	  main	  determinants	  of	   the	  traffic	  demand	  
are	  the	  economic	  activity	  and	  the	  fuel	  prices,	  and	  that	  summer	  and	  the	  introduction	  
of	  tolls	  are	  recognized	  as	  important	  factors	  to	  take	  into	  consideration,	  1-­‐R2	  will	  give	  
us	  a	  measure	  of	  that	  unexplained	  variation	  of	  demand.	  So,	  this	  unexplained	  variation	  
of	  traffic	  caused	  by	  unobserved	  circumstances	  will	  constitute	  the	  demand	  risk.	  
	  
4.1.4.	  Analysis	  of	  demand	  risk/variability	  
	  
To	  assess	  the	  demand	  risk	  of	  each	  highway	  we	  will	  perform	  OLS	  regressions	  of	  traffic	  
over	  the	  already	  referred	  variables	  to	  assess	  the	  (1-­‐R2)	  and	  distinguish	  the	  ones	  with	  
more	   demand	   risk.	   Those	   results	   will	   be	   compared	   to	   the	   results	   of	   the	   same	  
regressions	  but	  using	   the	   traffic	  data	  of	  Brisa’s	  highways,	   a	  private	  enterprise	   that	  
owns	   and	   manages	   the	   most	   important	   (with	   more	   traffic)	   highways	   in	   Portugal,	  
which	   will	   constitute	   our	   benchmark	   for	   demand	   risk.	   This	   comparison	   has	   to	   be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





done	  considering	  only	  data	  from	  January	  2008	  to	  September	  2010,	  since	  in	  October	  
2010	   the	   decision	   of	   introducing	   tolls	   in	   some	   SCUTS	   were	   taken	   and	   that	   event	  
(controlled	   by	   the	   dummy	   variable	   toll)	   will	   be	   highly	   significant	   in	   explaining	   the	  
variation	  of	  traffic,	  exponentially	  increasing	  the	  R2	  and	  thus	  compromising	  the	  basis	  
for	  comparison	  between	  highways.	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  refer	  also	  that	  Brisa	  have	  built	  some	  highways	  where	  the	  decision	  
of	   investment	   can	   be	   questionable,	   since	   its	   traffic	   variability	   appears	   to	   be	   also	  
substantial.	  	  
	  
4.1.5.	  The	  analysis	  of	  the	  renegotiation	  of	  2010	  
	  
In	  this	  section	  we	  will	  analyse	  the	  recent	  developments	  of	  the	  traffic	  volume	  of	  the	  
concessions	   that	   have	   been	   renegotiated	   in	   2010.	   To	   do	   so	   we	   will	   analyse	   the	  
pattern	  of	   traffic	   size	  until	  2010	  and	  after	  2010	  and	  compare	   them	  with	   the	   initial	  
contract	  forecast	  and	  with	  the	  reviewed	  forecasts	  made	  in	  2010	  for	  the	  year	  of	  2011.	  
We	  will	  assess	  the	  growth	  pattern	  that	  the	  SCUTS	  exhibited	  until	  2010	  and	  the	  not	  so	  





5.1.	  Results	  from	  panel	  regression	  
	  
The	  results	  from	  the	  panel	  regression	  (appendix	  A1)	  confirm	  the	  use	  of	  the	  variables	  
suggested	   since	   all	   are	   significant	   and	   have	   an	   expected	   logical	   coefficient.	   The	  
traffic	  demand	  varies	  positively	  with	   the	  economic	   growth	  and	   summer,	  while	   the	  
increase	   in	   fuel	   prices	   and	   the	   introduction	   of	   tolls	   have	   a	   negative	   impact	   in	   the	  









5.2.	  Measurement	  of	  risk	  of	  each	  concession/highway	  
	  
Here	   we	   will	   measure	   the	   demand	   risk	   of	   each	   highway	   given	   the	   (1-­‐R2)	   of	   each	  
regression.	   To	  make	   the	   comparison	  with	  Brisa’s	   highways,	  we	   restrict	   the	   sample	  
from	  January	  2008	  and	  September	  2010,	  because	  our	  R2	  would	  get	  influenced	  by	  the	  
introduction	  of	  tolls	  in	  Costa	  de	  Prata,	  Grande	  Porto	  and	  Norte	  Litoral.	  
The	  results	  of	  each	  regression	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  Appendix	  A2.	  For	  our	  analysis	  we’ll	  
focus	  on	  the	  (1-­‐R2)	  of	  each	  regression,	  as	  well	  as	   in	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  each	  
distribution	  to	  justify	  some	  incoherent	  results	  that	  may	  appear	  with	  the	  analysis.	  The	  
comparison	  has	   to	  be	  done	   through	  highways	   that	  have	   similar	   characteristics,	   for	  
which	  we	  will	  use	  the	  calculated	  coefficient	  of	  urbanism.	  The	  tables	  A3.1	  and	  A3.2	  of	  
the	   Appendix	   A3,	   summarizes	   the	   results	   regarding	   our	   risk	   indicator	   and	   some	  
descriptive	  statistics.	  
	  
5.2.1.	  Algarve	  A22	  and	  Costa	  de	  Prata	  A17	  
	  
The	  highway	  from	  Algarve,	  the	  A22,	  constitutes	  a	  very	  important	  route	  linking	  all	  the	  
coast	  of	   this	   region.	   The	  only	   alternative	   to	   this	  highway	   is	   the	  EN125,	   considered	  
one	   of	   the	   most	   dangerous	   roads	   in	   Portugal,	   with	   high	   levels	   of	   accident	   rates.	  
However,	   the	   summer	   season,	   characterized	   by	   a	   huge	   influx	   of	   tourists,	   highly	  
influences	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	   the	  distribution.	  And	  this	  may	  be	  conditioning	  
the	  result	  by	  explaining	  a	   lot	  the	  variation	  verified.	  The	  A17	  from	  Costa	  de	  Prata	   is	  
also	   a	   coast	   highway	   that	   crosses	   some	   locations,	   like	   Mira	   and	   Figueira	   da	   Fóz,	  
which	  is	  also	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  the	  summer	  season	  with	  a	  great	  influx	  of	  tourists.	  
The	  demand	  risk	  of	  these	  two	  highways	  should	  be	  compared	  to	  A14	  from	  Brisa.	  This	  
highway	   links	  Coimbra	   to	  Figueira	  da	  Fóz,	  and	  exhibits	  also	  seasonality	  variation	   in	  
the	  summer	  with	  a	  significant	   increase	   in	  the	  traffic	  volume.	  Regarding	  the	  results,	  
we	  can	  conclude	  that	  using	   this	   indicator	  as	  a	  measure	  of	   risk,	   the	  SCUT	  A22	   from	  
Algarve	   and	  A17	   from	  Costa	   de	   Prata	   exhibit	   less	   demand	   risk	   than	   the	   A14	   from	  
Brisa	   (A22:	   0.3322;	  A17:	   0.5680;	  A14:	   0.6063).	   This	   result	   is	   somehow	  expected	   in	  






5.2.2.	  Beira	  Interior	  A23,	  Costa	  de	  Prata	  A25	  and	  Beiras	  Litoral	  e	  Alta	  A25	  
	  
The	  A23	  from	  Beira	  Interior,	  A25	  from	  Costa	  de	  Prata	  and	  the	  sequence	  of	  A25	  from	  
Beiras	  Litoral	  e	  Alta,	  can	  be	  compared	  to	  the	  Brisa’s	  A6.	  A25	  from	  Beiras	  Litoral	  e	  Alta	  
has	   its	   continuation	   through	   the	   concession	   of	   Costa	   de	   Prata,	   so	   it	   seems	  
reasonable	  to	  compare	  them	  jointly.	  This	  part	  of	  A25	  and	  A23	  from	  Beira	  Interior	  are	  
located	   in	   the	   interior	  of	   the	   country	  and	  have	   similar	   types	  of	  population	  density	  
over	   its	  routes.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  the	  SCUTS	  Costa	  de	  Prata	  A23	  exhibits	  much	  
the	  same	  demand	  risk	  as	   the	  Brisa’s	  A6,	  while	  A25	  from	  Costa	  de	  Prata	  and	  Beiras	  
Litoral	  e	  Alta	  have	  less	  risk	  than	  A6	  (A23:	  0.4483;	  A25	  CP:	  0.4282;	  A25	  BLA:	  0.3971;	  
A6:	  0.4549).	  
	  
5.2.3.	  Costa	  de	  Prata	  A29,	  Grande	  Porto	  A4,	  A41	  and	  A42	  
	  
Costa	  de	  Prata	  A29,	  Grande	  Porto	  A4,	  A41	  and	  A42,	  are	  all	  in	  the	  area	  of	  the	  city	  of	  
Oporto,	  the	  second	  most	  important	  and	  populated	  city	  of	  Portugal.	  These	  roads	  are	  
used	  to	  connect	  the	  neighbouring	  towns	  to	  Oporto.	  They	  can	  be	  compared	  to	  A5	  and	  
A12	   from	  Brisa’s.	  Even	   if	   the	   former	  are	   located	   in	   the	  North	  and	   the	   latter	   in	   the	  
South,	  A5	  and	  A12	  are	  also	  in	  the	  metropolitan	  area	  of	  Lisbon	  and	  are	  used	  by	  the	  
population	  as	  a	  connection	  between	  Lisbon	  and	  the	  nearest	  areas.	  Comparing	  these	  
highways,	  and	  based	  on	  our	  indicator,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  the	  traffic	  in	  the	  SCUTS	  roads	  
is	   less	  predictable	  than	   in	  the	  Brisa’s	  highways,	  since	  the	  explanation	  power	  of	  our	  
model	   is	   lower	   in	   these	   highways.	   The	   SCUTS	   exhibit	   higher	   risk	   indicators	   (A29:	  
0.7374;	  A4:	  0.8721;	  A41:	  0.5975;	  A42:	  0.6335)	  than	  the	  ones	  managed	  by	  Brisa	  (A5:	  
0.5287;	  A12:	  0.6289).	  
	  
5.2.4.	  Interior	  Norte	  A24,	  Norte	  Litoral	  A28	  and	  A27	  
	  
The	  A24	  from	  Interior	  Norte,	  links	  Viseu	  to	  Vila	  Real	  and	  ends	  in	  Spain.	  A6	  from	  Brisa	  
in	  the	  one	  that	  better	  fits	  the	  comparison,	  since	  it	  starts	  in	  a	  more	  coaster	  area	  and	  
crosses	   the	   interior	   of	   the	   country	   through	   Spain.	   The	   risk	   indicator	   shows	   a	   very	  





The	  SCUT	  A28	  and	  A27,	  from	  the	  Norte	  Litoral	  concession	  are	   located	   in	  the	  North	  
Coast	  of	  Portugal.	  	  The	  A3	  (Brisa),	  also	  located	  in	  the	  north	  and	  is	  relatively	  closer	  to	  
the	   other	   two.	   By	   comparing	   these	   three	   highways,	   we	   found	   evidence	   of	   similar	  
patterns	  of	  predictability,	  based	  on	  the	  variables	  considered,	  on	  A28	  and	  A3	  and	  a	  
more	  risky	  profile	  of	  A27	  comparing	  to	  the	  benchmark	  highway	  (A27:	  0.3838;	  A28:	  
0.3619;	  A3:	   0.3570).	   Table	   4	  presents	   the	   results	   of	   the	   comparisons	  between	   the	  
SCUT’s	  and	  Brisa’s	  highways.	  
	  
Table	  4:	  Comparison	  of	  demand	  risk	  between	  SCUT’s	  and	  Brisa’s	  highways	  
This	  table	  identifies	  the	  different	  SCUTS	  highways	  and	  its	  correspondent	  compared	  highway	  in	  Brisa,	  
as	  well	  as	  which	  of	  them	  exhibits	  higher	  demand	  risk,	  based	  on	  the	  proposed	  indicator.	  
SCUT	   Brisa	   Higher	  demand	  risk	  
	   	   	   	  Algarve	  A22	  
A14	  
Brisa	  
Costa	  de	  Prata	  A17	   Brisa	  
Beira	  Interior	  A23	  
A6	  
Similar	  pattern	  
Costa	  de	  Prata	  A25	   Brisa	  
Beiras	  Litoral	  e	  Alta	  A25	   Brisa	  
Costa	  de	  Prata	  A29	  
A5	  and	  A12	  
SCUT	  
Grande	  Porto	  A4	   SCUT	  
Grande	  Porto	  A41	   SCUT	  
Grande	  Porto	  A42	   SCUT	  
Interior	  Norte	  A24	   A6	   Similar	  pattern	  
Norte	  Litoral	  A28	  
A3	  
Similar	  pattern	  
Norte	  Litoral	  A27	   SCUT	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  Made	  by	  the	  authors.	  
After	   doing	   all	   of	   this	   analysis,	   we	   must	   notice	   that	   since	   the	   highways	   are	   not	  
substitutes	   and	   do	   not	   have	   all	   the	   same	   conditions	   to	   make	   a	   straight	   forward	  
match	  between	  them,	  the	  comparisons	  of	  their	  predictability	  of	  traffic	  must	  be	  taken	  
carefully.	  
	  
5.3.	  An	  analysis	  of	  the	  2010	  renegotiation	  regarding	  demand	  traffic	  
	  
In	   October	   2010	   the	   government	   changed	   the	   model	   sharing	   demand	   risk	   of	   3	  
concessions:	   Norte	   Litoral,	   Costa	   de	   Prata	   and	  Grande	   Porto,	  with	   the	   purpose	   of	  
reducing	   the	   public	   deficit.	   These	   SCUTS	   passed	   from	   the	  method	   of	   payment	   by	  
bands	  to	  the	  method	  of	  payment	  by	  availability,	  where	  the	  revenues	  are	  guaranteed	  
to	   the	   private	   concession,	   as	   long	   as	   the	   roads	   are	   available	   to	   travel,	   and	   the	  





company).	   In	   this	   type	   of	   contracts,	   the	   demand	   risk	   is	   all	   carried	   by	   the	   public	  
sector,	  which	  does	  the	  payments	  to	  the	  private	  consortium	  based	  on	  the	  forecasted	  
demand	  of	  the	  contract.	  
	  
5.3.1.	  Renegotiation	  of	  Costa	  de	  Prata	  
	  
The	  2010	   renegotiation,	   at	   the	   same	   time	  modified	   the	  methods	  of	   payment,	   and	  
was	  expected	  to	  update	  the	  values	  for	  the	  traffic	  forecast.	  Our	  calculations	  based	  on	  
the	  historical	  monthly	  data	  available,	  indicates	  an	  average	  daily	  annual	  traffic	  (ADAT)	  
of	  32	  558	  vehicles	   in	  2008,	  36	  066	  vehicles	   in	  2009	  and	  a	  daily	   average	  of	  39	  428	  
vehicles	  from	  January	  to	  September	  2010.	  Even	  with	  the	  historical	  pattern	  of	  traffic	  
(grew	   10.8%	   in	   2009	   and	   9.3%	   in	   2010,	   until	   September)	   and	   with	   an	   expected	  
decrease	   caused	   by	   the	   introduction	   of	   tolls	   (INIR	   states	   that	   international	  
experiences	   indicates	  an	  average	  decrease	  of	  15%),	   the	   forecasted	   traffic	   for	  2011	  
was	  of	  52	  700	  vehicles.	  This	   forecast	   represents	  a	  growth	  rate	  of	  34%	  relatively	   to	  
the	   average	   traffic	   of	   the	   first	   9	  months	   of	   2010.	   The	   forecasted	   traffic	   of	   52	   700	  
should	  be	  compared	  to	  the	  real	  traffic	  verified	  of	  21	  477	  vehicles	  in	  2011.	  
Table	   A4.1,	   in	   the	   Appendix	   A4	   shows	   the	   results	   of	   applying	   the	  model	  we	   have	  
used	   in	   the	  previous	  section	  but	  here	   for	   the	  concession	  and	  not	   for	   the	  highways	  
individually.	  Assuming	  that	  for	  having	  an	  average	  daily	  annual	  (ADAT)	  increase	  of	  13	  
272	  vehicles	   the	   impact	  on	  average	  daily	  monthly	   traffic	   (ADMT)	  have	   to	  be	  of	  13	  
272	   vehicles	   in	   the	   first	  month,	   and	   not	   considering	   for	   a	   decrease	   caused	   by	   the	  
introduction	  of	  tolls,	  the	  results	  suggest	  that,	  ceteris	  paribus,	   it	  would	  be	  needed	  a	  
monthly	   growth	   rate	   y-­‐on-­‐y	   of	   51%.	   Or,	   in	   other	   way,	   to	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   the	  
average	  daily	  traffic	  of	  13	  272	  vehicles,	  the	  fuel	  price,	  ceteris	  paribus,	  would	  have	  to	  
fall	  €0.83.	  This	  analysis	  might	  be	  not	  realistic,	  since	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  have	  only	  
the	  gdp	  or	  fuel	  varying	  and	  because	  our	  model	  only	  justifies	  35%	  of	  the	  variation	  of	  
traffic	   demand.	   Moreover,	   it	   is	   assumed	   that	   all	   ADMT	   grow	   to	   the	   same	   traffic	  
volume	  and	  we	  have	  seen	  that,	   for	   instance,	   in	  the	  summer	  months	  the	  volume	  of	  
traffic	  is	  above	  the	  remaining	  months.	  But	  this	  constitutes	  a	  number	  to	  reflect	  how	  
much	  unrealistic	  was	  the	  projection,	  intensified	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  2010	  Portugal	  was	  





The	   Figure	   A4.1,	   in	   the	   appendix	   A4,	   illustrates	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   real	   traffic	   in	  
Costa	   de	   Prata	   compared	   with	   the	   forecasts.	   Unfortunately,	   we	   do	   not	   have	  
information	  about	  the	  forecasted	  demand	  of	  the	  period	  2008	  –	  2010.	  Although,	  the	  
historical	  data	  of	  2011	  show	  that	  the	  ADAT	  was	  21	  477	  in	  this	  year,	  which	  represents	  
a	  decrease	  of	  46%	  relatively	  to	  the	  period	  from	  January	  to	  September	  of	  2010	  and	  
only	  40.7%	  of	  what	  was	  forecasted	  for	  2011.	  So,	  the	  forecast	  error	  was	  about	  60%	  of	  
the	  traffic	  volume	  in	  2011.	  The	  extrapolation	  presented	  in	  Figure	  1,	  is	  based	  on	  the	  
historical	  data	  of	  Costa	  de	  Prata	  until	  October	  2010.	  	  
	  
Figure	  1.	  Costa	  de	  Prata	  Real	  traffic	  vs	  2011	  ADAT	  forecast	  vs	  Adjusted	  tendency.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Source:	  Made	  by	  the	  authors,	  based	  on	  the	  traffic	  data	  available.	  
	  
Estimating	  the	  tendency,	  not	  counting	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  tolls	  and	  assuming	  that	  
the	   traffic	  would	   continue	   to	  have	   the	   same	  pattern	  of	   growth,	   the	  average	  of	   52	  
700	  vehicles	  forecasted	  for	  2011,	  would	  only	  be	  achieved	  on	  January	  2014.	  However,	  
for	  2014	  the	  forecasted	  traffic	  will	  be	  well	  above	  the	  52	  700.	  This	  analysis	  leads	  us	  to	  
conclude	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  introduction	  of	  tolls,	  the	  forecasts	  were	  
inexplicable	  above	  of	  what	  could	  be	  projected	  for	  the	  future,	  based	  on	  the	  historical	  
data.	  With	   the	   information	   available	   in	   2010	   and	   even	   if	  we	   do	   not	   count	   for	   the	  












traffic	  should	  be	  around	  a	  ADAT	  of	  43	  529	  for	  2011,	  well	  below	  the	  52	  700	  vehicles	  
forecasted	  (which	  have	  counted	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  tolls).	  
	  
5.3.2.	  Renegotiation	  of	  Norte	  Litoral	  
	  
From	  2008	  to	  2010,	  the	  concession	  Norte	  Litoral	  registered	  ADAT	  of	  27	  774	  vehicles	  
in	  2008,	  28	  910	  in	  2009	  and	  an	  average	  traffic	  of	  29	  666	  from	  January	  to	  September	  
2010.	  This	  represented	  a	  growth	  rate	  of	  4.1%	  in	  2009	  and	  2.6%	  in	  2010.	  The	  average	  
ADAT	  forecasted	  in	  the	  Base	  Case	  for	  the	  period	  2008	  –	  2010	  were	  24	  700	  vehicles,	  
which	  should	  be	  compared	  to	  the	  average	  28	  783	  of	  real	  traffic	  verified,	  establishing	  
a	  forecast	  error	  of	  17%.	  For	  this	  period	  the	  real	  traffic	  verified	  revealed	  to	  be	  higher	  
than	   what	   was	   projected	   primarily.	   The	   initial	   concession	   contract	   forecasted	   for	  
2011	  an	  ADAT	  of	  25	  600	  vehicles.	  The	  2010	  renegotiation	  decided	  to	  keep	  the	  values	  
forecasted	   for	  2011.	  Table	  A5.1,	   in	   the	  appendix	  A5,	   shows	   the	   results	  of	  applying	  
the	   model	   we	   have	   used	   but	   for	   the	   concession	   and	   not	   for	   the	   highways	  
individually.	  The	  figure	  2	  illustrates	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  real	  and	  forecasted	  
traffic	  over	  the	  period	  2008-­‐2011.	  	  
	  
Figure	  2.	  Norte	  Litoral	  real	  traffic	  vs	  traffic	  forecasts.	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From	   2010	   to	   2011,	   the	   average	   traffic	   decreased	   26%	   to	   21	   893	   vehicles	   which	  
compares	   to	   the	   25	   600	   predicted.	   The	   real	   traffic	   was	   86%	   of	   the	   forecast,	  
constituting	  a	  forecast	  error	  of	  15%.	  This	  result	  evidences	  again	  a	  bad	  forecast	  of	  the	  
negative	   effect	   that	   is	   expected	   from	   the	   introduction	   of	   tolls	   (given	   the	   negative	  
elasticity	   of	   demand)	   that	   was	   also	   heightened	   by	   the	   economic	   crisis	   that	   was	  
already	  installed.	  
	  
5.3.3.	  Renegotiation	  of	  Grande	  Porto	  
	  
The	  historical	  data	  of	  traffic	  in	  the	  Grande	  Porto	  concession	  show	  an	  ADAT	  of	  37	  218	  
vehicles	   in	   2008,	   39	   508	   vehicles	   in	   2009	   and	   an	   average	   of	   39	   415	   vehicles	   from	  
January	  to	  September	  2010.	  This	  represents	  a	  positive	  variation	  of	  6.2%	  in	  2009	  and	  
a	  relatively	  constant	  (-­‐0.2%)	  volume	  of	  traffic	  from	  2009	  to	  2010.	  The	  historical	  data	  
of	  this	  concession	  evidences	  an	  average	  daily	  annual	  traffic	  of	  38	  714	  vehicles	  for	  the	  
period	   of	   2008-­‐2010,	   when	   the	   predictions	   of	   the	   initial	   Base	   Case	  where	   58	   300	  
vehicles,	  constituting	  a	  forecast	  error	  of	  34%	  (the	  real	  traffic	  was	  only	  66%	  of	  what	  
was	  projected).	  
The	   renegotiation	  of	  2010	   reviewed	   the	   forecasted	  demand	  of	  62	  400	  vehicles	   for	  
2011	  to	  45	  500	  vehicles.	  This	  represents	  a	  very	  optimistic	  forecast	  traffic	  variation	  of	  
15.4%	   relatively	   to	   2010.	   Portugal	   was	   passing	   through	   a	   very	   difficult	   economic	  
situation,	  with	   expectations	   of	   zero	   economic	   growth	   (or	   even	   recession)	   and	   the	  
introduction	  of	  tolls	  would	  make	  us	  expect	  a	  decrease	  of	  the	  traffic	  volume.	  
Table	  A6.1,	   in	  the	  appendix	  A6	  shows	  the	  results	  of	  the	  estimation	  of	  the	  traffic	  of	  
the	   concession	   over	   the	   considered	   variables,	   for	   the	   period	   of	   January	   2008	   to	  
September	  2010.	  
The	   impact	   of	   gdp	   is	   not	   significant	   in	   the	   concession	   Grande	   Porto.	   However,	  
applying	  the	  same	  reasoning	  as	  we	  did	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  concession	  Costa	  de	  Prata,	  
in	  order	  to	  have	  an	  average	  daily	  monthly	  increase	  (ADMT)	  of	  6	  085	  vehicles	  in	  the	  
first	  month	  (assuming	  that	  all	  the	  a	  ADMTs	  would	  increase	  6085	  vehicles	  to	  have	  an	  
ADAT	  increase	  of	  6085	  vehicles	  for	  the	  overall	  year),	  the	  fuel	  prices,	  ceteris	  paribus,	  
would	  have	  to	  fall	  approximately	  €0.73.	  These	  numbers	  are	  again	  unrealistic	  because	  





economies.	  Moreover,	   it	   is	  assumed	  that	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  ADMT	  is	  equal	   in	  all	  
months	   and,	   besides	   that,	   our	   model	   only	   explains	   29.3%	   of	   the	   variation	   of	   the	  
traffic	   demand,	   based	  on	   the	   considered	   variables.	   So,	   70%	  of	   the	   variation	   is	   not	  
explained.	   Even	   so,	   the	   forecast	  made	   in	   the	  2010	   renegotiation	   seems	   to	  us	   very	  
optimistic	   given	   the	  historical	   data	   and	   the	   fact	   that	  we	  have	   to	   consider	   also	   the	  
expected	  negative	  impact	  from	  the	  introduction	  of	  tolls.	  	  
Figure	   A6.1,	   of	   the	   Appendix	   A6	   shows	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   real	   traffic	   of	   the	  
concession	  Grande	  Porto	  with	  comparison	  to	  the	  forecasted	  values.	  The	  forecasted	  
traffic	  accounted	  for	  an	  increase	  of	  15.4%	  but,	  as	  we	  can	  see,	  the	  real	  traffic	  in	  2011	  
was	  well	  below	  the	  forecasted	  value.	  Actually,	  the	  traffic	  volume	  decreased	  by	  43.7%	  
compared	  with	   the	  period	  of	   January	   to	   September	  2010	  and	   corresponds	   to	  only	  
about	  48.8%	  of	  what	  was	  projected.	  The	  real	  traffic	  verified	  was	   less	  than	  a	  half	  of	  
what	  was	  forecasted,	  constituting	  a	  forecast	  error	  of	  51%.	  Figure	  3	  shows	  the	  results	  
of	  the	  extrapolation	  of	  future	  traffic	  based	  on	  the	  data	  available	  until	  October	  2010.	  
	  
Figure	  3.	  Grande	  Porto	  Real	  traffic	  vs	  2011	  ADAT	  forecast	  vs	  Adjusted	  tendency.	  
	  
Source:	  Made	  by	  the	  authors,	  based	  on	  traffic	  data	  available.	  
	  
If	   we	   extrapolate	   the	   future	   traffic	   based	   on	   the	   historical	   data	   available	   until	  
October	  2010	  on	  Grande	  Porto,	  by	  estimating	   the	   tendency,	  we	   find	   that	   the	  daily	  
average	   of	   45	   500	   vehicles	   would	   only	   be	   achieved	   on	   April	   2014,	   where	   the	  













conclude	   that	   the	   projections	  made	   for	   2011,	   in	   addition	   to	   do	   not	   count	   for	   the	  
negative	   impact	  of	  the	   introduction	  of	  tolls,	  where	  very	  optimistic	  and	   in	  complete	  
discordance	   to	   what	   where	   the	   traffic	   profile	   until	   October	   2010.	   Based	   on	   the	  
historical	   records,	   and	   even	   if	   we	   do	   not	   count	   for	   the	   negative	   impact	   of	   the	  
introduction	  of	  tolls	  (which	  was	  one	  of	  the	  main	  reasons	  for	  the	  renegotiation),	  the	  
traffic	  forecasts,	  based	  on	  our	  projections,	  should	  be	  a	  ADAT	  of	  41	  618	  vehicles.	  This	  
is	   again	   well	   below	   the	   45	   500	   vehicles	   forecasted,	   even	   not	   considering	   for	   the	  
introduction	   of	   tolls	   (which	   must	   have	   been	   considered	   by	   the	   authorities	   in	   the	  
renegotiation).	  
Table	  5	  and	  table	  6	  summarize	  the	  results	  obtained	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  forecasted	  
traffic	  demand	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  real	  traffic	  verified.	  
	  
Table	  5:	  Real	  vs	  forecasted	  traffic	  for	  the	  period	  2008	  -­‐	  2010	  
Before	  renegotiation	  -­‐	  Period	  2008	  -­‐	  2010	  
	  	   Real	  traffic	   Forecasted	  Traffic	   Forecasted	  error	  
Costa	  de	  Prata	   36017	   not	  available	   not	  available	  
Norte	  Litoral	   28783	   24700	   -­‐17%	  
Grande	  Porto	   38714	   58300	   34%	  
Source:	  Made	  by	  the	  authors,	  based	  on	  INIR	  data	  and	  own	  calculations.	  
	  
Table	  6:	  Real	  vs	  forecasted	  traffic	  for	  the	  period	  2011	  
After	  renegotiation	  -­‐	  2011	  
	  	   Real	  traffic	   Forecasted	  traffic	   Forecasted	  error	  
Costa	  de	  Prata	   21477	   52700	   59%	  
Norte	  Litoral	   21893	   25600	   14%	  
Grande	  Porto	   22198	   45500	   51%	  
















Table	  7:	  Comparison	  between	  historical	  growth	  rate	  and	  forecasted	  growth	  rate	  of	  
traffic	  for	  2011	  
This	  table	  identifies	  the	  traffic	  growth	  rates	  in	  2009	  and	  2010,	  based	  on	  the	  available	  historical	  data.	  
The	  column	  “renegotiation	  forecast”	  identifies	  the	  expected	  traffic	  growth	  for	  2011,	  based	  on	  the	  real	  
traffic	  of	  2010,	  of	  the	  October	  2010	  renegotiation.	  “INIR	  forecast”	  identifies	  the	  expected	  decrease	  of	  
traffic	  of	  INIR	  and	  “Real	  traffic”	  recognizes	  the	  effective	  variation	  of	  real	  traffic	  from	  2010	  to	  2011.	  
	  






	  	   Year	  2009	   Year	  2010	   	  	  	  	  Year	  2011	   	  	  	  	  	  Year	  2011	   Year	  2011	  
Costa	  de	  Prata	   11.8%	   9.3%	   33.6%	   -­‐15%	   -­‐45.5%	  
Norte	  Litoral	   4.1%	   2.6&	   -­‐11.0%	   -­‐15%	   -­‐26.2%	  
Grande	  Porto	   6.2%	   -­‐0.2%	   15.4%	   -­‐15%	   -­‐43.7%	  
Source:	  Made	  by	  the	  authors,	  based	  on	  INIR	  data	  and	  own	  calculations.	  
	  
The	  initial	  forecasted	  values	  revealed	  misappropriated	  to	  the	  real	  traffic	  verified.	  The	  
renegotiation	   of	   2010,	   that	   should	   update	   those	   forecasted	   values	   to	   reasonable	  
values	  and	  account	  for	  a	  decrease	  resulting	  from	  the	  introduction	  of	  tolls	  (which	  INIR	  
indicates	   as	   15%	   on	   average,	   based	   on	   international	   experiences),	   revealed	  
inadequate	  again.	  The	  forecasts	  were	  very	  optimistic	  and	  did	  not	  take	  into	  account	  
the	  historical	  evidence	  of	  the	  pattern	  of	  traffic,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  negative	  effect	  of	  tolls.	  
Grande	   Porto	   and	   Costa	   de	   Prata	   counted	   51%	   and	   59%	   of	   forecast	   errors,	  
respectively.	  
	  
6. Limitations	  of	  the	  study	  
	  
This	   study	   presents	   some	   limitations,	   which	   have	   to	   be	   considered.	   The	   model	  
proposed	  to	  estimate	  the	  demand	  risk	  of	  each	  highway	  presents	  some	  restrictions	  to	  
estimate	   the	   demand	   risk	   per	   se.	   The	   value	   of	   R2	   of	   each	   highway	   is	   not	   a	   good	  
indicator	  per	  se,	  since	  it	  can	  be	  conditioned	  by	  the	  highly	  significance	  of	  a	  variable.	  
Therefore,	   the	   risk	  measures	   have	   to	   be	  made	   on	   a	   basis	   of	   comparison	   between	  
SCUTS	   highways	   and	   Brisa’s	   highways,	   which	   have	   to	   present	   characteristics	   as	  
similar	  as	  possible,	  in	  order	  to	  compare	  its	  risk	  indicators	  (1-­‐R2).	  The	  comparison	  had	  
to	  be	  done	  using	  only	  the	  data	  for	  the	  period	  before	  the	  introduction	  of	  tolls,	  since	  
the	   insertion	  of	   the	  dummy	  variable	  “toll”	  would	  be	  highly	  significant	   in	  explaining	  
the	   variation	   of	   traffic,	   causing	   a	   huge	   increase	   in	   the	   R2	   and,	   in	   this	   way,	  





from	   January	   2008	   to	   September	   2010.	   It	   would	   be	   interesting	   to	   perform	   this	  
analysis	   for	   the	   period	   after	   the	   introduction	   of	   tolls,	   to	   compare	   the	   ex-­‐SCUTS	  
highways,	  which	  have	  now	  tolls,	  with	  the	  ones	  from	  Brisa.	  However,	  we	  would	  only	  
have	  13	  observations	  to	  do	  so.	  
Regarding	   the	  analysis	  of	   the	  2010	   renegotiation,	   it	  does	  not	  present	  an	  extensive	  
data	   on	   the	   traffic	   of	   the	   various	   highways,	   leading	   to	   an	   analysis	   centred	   on	   the	  
period	  2008-­‐2011.	  Additionally,	   the	  unavailability	  of	   the	  base	  cases	  concerning	   the	  
traffic	   forecasts	  and	  the	   information	  of	  models	  used	  by	  the	  authorities,	   limited	  the	  
analysis	   to	   the	   data	   available	   in	   INIR,	   which	   for	   instance	   does	   not	   provide	   the	  




The	   last	   decade	   in	   Portugal	   coincided	  with	   a	   period	   of	   low	   economic	   growth.	   The	  
needed	  real	  convergence	  disappointed	  and	  the	  entry	  in	  the	  European	  single	  currency	  
helped	   to	   show	   the	   divergence	   that	   already	   persists	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   major	  
European	  economies.	  The	  gap	  of	  education,	  productivity,	   judicial	  efficiency	  and	  the	  
lack	   of	   infrastructures	   have	   been	   used	   to	   justify	   the	   Portuguese	   growth	   delay	  
relatively	  to	  the	  core	  countries	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  
Given	  the	  fiscal	  constraints	  and	  the	  debt	  limits	  imposed	  by	  the	  entry	  in	  the	  monetary	  
union,	  Portugal	  followed	  the	  path	  of	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	  to	  try	  to	  modernize	  
the	   country	   constructing	  new	   infrastructures,	   giving	  more	  opportunities	   to	   growth	  
and	  generating	  employment,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  industry	  sector.	  
The	   7	   SCUTS	   PPP	   projects	   were	   launched	   with	   the	   intent	   of	   develop	   the	   more	  
repressed	  areas	  of	  Portugal.	  However,	  their	  effective	  location	  were	  not	  so	  into	  this	  
criteria	   as	  we	   could	  expect	   (as	   it	   is	   the	  example	  of	   concession	  Grande	  Porto).	   The	  
comparative	   risk	   analysis	   based	   on	   the	   variables	   considered	   found	   the	   A22	   in	  
Algarve,	  A17	  in	  Costa	  de	  Prata,	  A25	  in	  Beiras	  Litoral	  e	  Alta	  and	  in	  Costa	  de	  Prata	  as	  
having	   less	   demand	   risk	   than	   its	   correspondent	   highways	   in	   Brisa.	  Moreover,	   A23	  
from	  Beira	  Interior,	  A24	  from	  Interior	  Norte	  and	  A28	  from	  Norte	  Litoral	  exhibit	  the	  
same	  pattern	  of	  risk	  as	  its	  compared	  highways,	  where	  the	  demand	  risk	  was	  carried	  





Costa	  de	  Prata	  and	  A27	  from	  Norte	  Litoral	  revealed	  less	  predictability,	  and	  so,	  higher	  
demand	  risk	  than	  the	  highways	  from	  Brisa.	  	  
These	  comparisons	  between	  the	  SCUTS	  highways	  and	  Brisa’s	  highways	  must	  be	  done	  
carefully.	  Since	  the	  Brisa’s	  highways	  already	  had	  (and	  always	  had)	  tolls,	  it	  may	  let	  us	  
considering	   that	   its	   R2	   can	   be	   less	   than	   if	   they	   do	   not	   had	   tolls.	   This	  might	   occur	  
because	  in	  paid	  highways	  people	  will	  only	  use	  them	  if	  they	  really	  have	  to	  use	  and	  in	  
these	  cases	  the	  explanatory	  power	  of	  the	  model	  may	  come	  conditioned.	  
The	  decision	  of	  introduction	  tolls	  in	  some	  SCUTS	  in	  2010	  raised	  two	  questions:	  1)	  will	  
the	   forecasted	  errors	  be	   corrected	  and	  adjusted	   to	   the	  historical	  data?	  And	  2)	  are	  
those	  highways	  really	  useful	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  tolls	  cause,	  as	  it	  is	  mentioned	  by	  
INIR,	   a	   fall	   of	   15%	  on	   the	   average	   traffic	   based	   on	   international	   experiences?	   The	  
analysis	  showed	  that	  the	  first	  did	  not	  apply	  and	  the	  second	  appear	  as	  a	  big	  doubt.	  As	  
we	  can	  observe	  in	  the	  figures	  A7.1	  and	  A7.2	  of	  the	  Appendix	  A7,	  the	  traffic	  forecasts	  
of	   the	   initial	   SCUTS	   contracts	   revealed	   very	   optimistic	   for	   the	   concession	   Grande	  
Porto	  and	  Costa	  de	  Prata	  and	  below	  the	  real	  traffic	  in	  concession	  Norte	  Litoral.	  The	  
projection	  period	  2008-­‐2010	  for	  Costa	  de	  Prata	  is	  not	  available.	  However,	  in	  Grande	  
Porto	   the	   forecast	  error	   for	   the	  period	  2008-­‐2010	  was	  about	  34%	  relatively	   to	   the	  
real	   traffic	   verified	   and	   in	   Norte	   Litoral	   the	   real	   traffic	   was	   more	   17%	   than	   the	  
volume	  verified.	  
The	  2010	  renegotiation	  should	  have	  updated	  the	  previous	  forecasts,	  counting	  for	  the	  
negative	   impact	  of	   the	   introduction	  of	   tolls	  and	   for	   the	   fact	   that	  Portugal	  was	   in	  a	  
severe	  economic	  crisis.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  proved	  again	  to	  be	  even	  more	  optimistic	  and	  
misappropriated.	  In	  Grande	  Porto	  and	  Costa	  de	  Prata	  the	  forecasted	  traffic	  for	  2011	  
was	   exponentially	   greater	   than	   the	   historical	   data	   from	   2008-­‐2010.	   In	   2011	   the	  
forecasted	  errors	  assumed	  unexplained	  values.	  The	  traffic	  in	  Grande	  Porto	  and	  Costa	  
de	   Prata	   represented	   only	   49%	   and	   41%,	   of	   the	   respective	   forecasts,	   constituting	  
forecast	  errors	  of	  51%	  and	  59%,	  which	  seems	  to	  be	  very	  huge	  even	  considering	  the	  
economic	   crisis	   developments	   in	   2011.	   Even	   if	   the	   forecasts	   did	   not	   count	   for	   the	  
negative	  impact	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  tolls,	  extrapolating	  the	  traffic	  demand	  based	  
on	  the	  historical	  data	  available,	  the	  forecasts	  of	  Costa	  de	  Prata	  and	  Grande	  Porto	  will	  
only	  start	  to	  be	  achieved	  in	  January	  2014	  and	  April	  2014,	  respectively.	  This	  indicates	  





inexplicable	  optimistic.	  In	  other	  hand,	  the	  forecast	  traffic	  for	  Norte	  Litoral,	  which	  had	  
revealed	   lower	   than	   the	   real	   traffic	   verified	   in	  2008-­‐2010,	  proved	   to	  be	  above	   the	  
real	  traffic	  for	  the	  forecast	  for	  2011.	  Here,	  the	  forecast	  error	  changed	  from	  -­‐17%	  to	  
14%	  beyond	  the	  effective	  traffic,	  underestimating	  again	  the	  negative	   impact	  of	  the	  
introduction	  of	  tolls.	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  with	  the	  renegotiation,	  in	  addition	  to	  
do	   not	   correct	   the	   traffic	   forecasts	   to	   the	   historical	   pattern	   of	   traffic,	   the	   new	  
projections	  worsened	  the	  errors,	  given	  this	  scenario	  of	  introduction	  of	  tolls.	  
These	  results	  are	  in	  accordance	  with	  our	  findings	  regarding	  the	  demand	  risk	  analysis.	  
Given	  that	  Grande	  Porto	  and	  Costa	  de	  Prata	  are	  composed	  by	  highways	  in	  which	  the	  
predictability	  of	  traffic	  is	  lower,	  its	  forecast	  error	  revealed	  superior.	  Even	  though,	  we	  
are	  very	  concerned	  about	  the	  magnitude	  of	  these	  numbers.	  The	  renegotiation	  led	  to	  
very	  strange	  forecasts,	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  past	  and	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  Costa	  de	  Prata	  
and	   Grande	   Porto	   well	   above	   the	   traffic	   patterns	   until	   then.	   This	   could	   let	   us	  
consider	  that	  probably	  the	  public	  purse	  could	  have	  been	  better	  protected	  and	  their	  
interests	  better	  negotiated.	  Moreover,	  the	  fact	  that	  international	  experiments	  show	  
an	   average	   drop	   of	   15%	  with	   the	   introduction	   of	   tolls	   and	   that	   in	   the	   Portuguese	  
case	  that	  was	  far	  greater,	  leads	  us	  to	  question	  whether	  those	  highways	  were	  really	  
needed.	  A	  so	  high	  initial	  forecast	  error	  and	  a	  so	  abnormal	  fall	  with	  the	  introduction	  
of	   tolls	   let	  us	   to	   consider,	   at	   least,	   that	   those	   investments	  were	  not	   so	  useful	   and	  
that	   they	  were	   carried	   out	   because	   of	   the	   possibility	   of	   put	   them	   in	   an	   off	   sheet	  
balance,	   to	   promote	   employment	   and	   economic	   growth	   in	   those	   years	   of	  
construction,	  rather	  than	  to	  mitigate	  an	  absolute	  necessity.	  A	  so	  higher	  error	  in	  the	  
traffic	  demand	  has	  been	  counting	  for	  a	  great	  pressure	  in	  the	  State	  budget	  given	  that	  
the	   predictions	   of	   revenues	   with	   the	   introducing	   tolls	   were	   made	   through	   traffic	  














Appendix	  A1	  –	  Panel	  regression	  
Traffic	   Coef.	  
Robust	  std.	  
errors	   t	   P>|t|	  
gdp	   123.1338	   34.70439	   3.55	   0.005	  
fuel	   -­‐4133.173	   1203.903	   -­‐3.43	   0.006	  
toll	   -­‐10742.87	   2252.075	   -­‐4.77	   0.001	  
summer	   3410.52	   717.0575	   4.76	   0.001	  
const	   30609.27	   1874.686	   16.33	   0.000	  
	  
Pooled	  OLS	  vs	  FE:	  F(11;560)=871.903,	  p-­‐value=0;	  Validates	  the	  alternative	  hypothesis	  of	  FE.	  
Pooled	  OLS	  vs	  RE	  (Breusch-­‐Pagan):	  LM=10505.1;	  𝑝 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝜒! 1 > 10505.1 = 0;	  Does	  not	  accept	  
the	  Pooled	  OLS	  as	  adequate	  model.	  
FE	  vs	  RE	  (Hausman):	  H=32.2061;	  𝑝 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝜒! 4 > 32.2061 = 1.73624𝑒!!.!;	  Does	  not	  accept	  the	  
null	  hypothesis	  of	  consistent	  RE	  estimates.	  Validates	  the	  alternative	  hypothesis	  of	  FE.	  
	  
Appendix	  A2	  –	  Individual	  regressions	  
	  
Algarve	  
Traffic	   Coef.	   Std.	  errors	   t	   P>|t|	  
gdpweight	   -­‐265.1406	   222.7527	   -­‐1.19	   0.244	  
fuel_price	   9815.682	   6163.919	   1.59	   0.122	  
summer	   8237.683	   1275.747	   6.46	   0.000	  
const	   3396.329	   3396.329	   0.43	   0.674	  
	   R2=0.6677	  
Beira	  Interior	  
Traffic	   Coef.	   Std.	  errors	   t	   P>|t|	  
gdpweight	   -­‐19.71538	   87.66577	   -­‐0.22	   0.824	  
fuel_price	   676.2631	   2077.885	   0.33	   0.747	  
summer	   2361.089	   430.0601	   5.49	   0.000	  
const	   9018.38	   2692.531	   3.35	   0.002	  
	   R2=0.5517	  
Beiras	  Litoral	  e	  Alta	  
Traffic	   Coef.	   Std.	  errors	   t	   P>|t|	  
gdpweight	   50.29005	   109.8669	   0.46	   0.651	  
fuel_price	   -­‐48.20645	   2449.7	   -­‐0.02	   0.984	  
summer	   3153.673	   507.0148	   6.22	   0.000	  
const	   12823.14	   3174.331	   4.04	   0.000	  





Costa	  de	  Prata	  A17	  
Traffic	   Coef.	   Std.	  errors	   t	   P>|t|	  
gdpweight	   432.147	   202.4115	   2.13	   0.041	  
fuel_price	   -­‐15548.17	   5322.884	   -­‐2.92	   0.007	  
summer	   4878.138	   1101.678	   4.43	   0.000	  
const	   36661.03	   6897.415	   5.32	   0.000	  
	   R2=0.4324	  
Costa	  de	  Prata	  A25	  
Traffic	   Coef.	   Std.	  errors	   t	   P>|t|	  
gdpweight	   133.1973	   171.0697	   0.78	   0.443	  
fuel_price	   -­‐5436.919	   5088.158	   -­‐1.07	   0.294	  
summer	   6449.612	   1053.097	   6.12	   0.000	  
const	   38005.23	   6593.257	   5.76	   0.000	  
	   R2=0.5719	  
Costa	  de	  Prata	  A29	  
Traffic	   Coef.	   Std.	  errors	   t	   P>|t|	  
gdpweight	   355.6551	   149.9589	   2.37	   0.025	  
fuel_price	   -­‐7730.357	   4895.404	   -­‐1.58	   0.125	  
summer	   2608.849	   1013.203	   2.57	   0.015	  
const	   55842.63	   6343.485	   8.80	   0.000	  
	   R2=0.2627	  
Grande	  Porto	  A4	  
Traffic	   Coef.	   Std.	  errors	   t	   P>|t|	  
gdpweight	   -­‐3497829	   104.9664	   -­‐0.33	   0.741	  
fuel_price	   -­‐6700.332	   4682.159	   -­‐1.43	   0.163	  
summer	   796.1759	   969.0673	   0.82	   0.418	  
const	   65057.6	   6067.161	   10.72	   0.000	  
	   R2=0.1280	  
Grande	  Porto	  A41	  
Traffic	   Coef.	   Std.	  errors	   t	   P>|t|	  
gdpweight	   287.5	   94.29849	   3.05	   0.005	  
fuel_price	   -­‐13432.96	   4207.107	   -­‐3.19	   0.003	  
summer	   3161.469	   870.7456	   3.63	   0.001	  
const	   59493.27	   5451.586	   10.91	   0.000	  
	   R2=0.4029	  
Grande	  Porto	  A42	  
Traffic	   Coef.	   Std.	  errors	   t	   P>|t|	  
gdpweight	   176.911	   72.10998	   2.45	   0.020	  
fuel_price	   -­‐6732.845	   2144.781	   -­‐3.14	   0.004	  
summer	   1531.031	   443.9056	   3.45	   0.002	  
const	   32613.25	   2779.216	   11.73	   0.000	  







Traffic	   Coef.	   Std.	  errors	   t	   P>|t|	  
gdpweight	   215.3477	   73.32866	   2.94	   0.006	  
fuel_price	   -­‐2469.436	   1735.989	   -­‐1.42	   0.166	  
summer	   1973.39	   359.298	   5.49	   0.000	  
const	   9120.619	   2249.502	   4.05	   0.000	  
	   R2=0.3667	  
Norte	  Litoral	  A27	  
Traffic	   Coef.	   Std.	  errors	   t	   P>|t|	  
gdpweight	   42.8771	   61.20857	   0.70	   0.489	  
fuel_price	   -­‐731.2585	   1820.538	   -­‐0.40	   0.691	  
summer	   2455.254	   376.7971	   6.52	   0.000	  
const	   10832.57	   2359.061	   4.59	   0.000	  
	   R2=0.6163	  
Norte	  Litoral	  A28	  
Traffic	   Coef.	   Std.	  errors	   t	   P>|t|	  
gdpweight	   78.30328	   119.4976	   0.66	   0.517	  
fuel_price	   -­‐3298.807	   3730.748	   -­‐0.88	   0.384	  
summer	   5380.047	   772.1536	   6.97	   0.000	  
const	   36651.04	   4834.319	   7.58	   0.000	  




Table	  A3.1.	  Demand	  risks,	  average	  traffic	  and	  std.	  dev.	  of	  each	  highway	  -­‐	  SCUTS	  










Algarve	  A22	   18570	   31764	   13365	   5062.3	   0.273	   1.861	   0.3322	  
Beira	  Interior	  A23	   10552	   14529	   8669	   1469.2	   0.139	   1.594	   0.4483	  
Beiras	  Litoral	  e	  Alta	  
A25	  
13578	   18899	   11349	   1840.6	   0.136	   1.499	  
0.3971	  
Costa	  de	  Prata	  A17	   17524	   24829	   11043	   3345	   0.191	   1.768	   0.5680	  
Costa	  de	  Prata	  A25	   32608	   41524	   27534	   3682	   0.113	   2.000	   0.4282	  
Costa	  de	  Prata	  A29	   46151	   52018	   40896	   2699.2	   0.058	   2.195	   0.7374	  
Grande	  Porto	  A4	   57701	   61976	   51029	   2373.9	   0.041	   3.000	   0.8721	  
Grande	  Porto	  A41	   42558	   47912	   38482	   2577.6	   0.061	   3.000	   0.5975	  
Grande	  Porto	  A42	   24155	   26507	   21866	   1276	   0.053	   2.000	   0.6335	  
Interior	  Norte	  A24	   6282.6	   10626	   4640	   1240.1	   0.197	   1.592	   0.4393	  
Norte	  Litoral	  A27	   10511	   14937	   8984	   1391.4	   0.132	   2.000	   0.3838	  






Table	  A3.2.	  Demand	  risks,	  average	  traffic	  and	  std.	  dev.	  of	  each	  highway	  –	  Brisa	  
	  










A1	   33691	   44125	   26944	   3962.8	   0.118	   2.284	   0.4431	  
A2	   17758	   32716	   11970	   5403.2	   0.304	   1.416	   0.3874	  
A3	   18476	   24238	   14872	   2490.8	   0.135	   2.296	   0.3570	  




2	   63940	   10849	   0.134	   3.000	   0.5287	  
A6	   5215.2	   6655	   4073	   629.73	   0.121	   1.438	   0.4549	  
A9	   26016	   29316	   13331	   2982.6	   0.115	   3.000	   0.9299	  
A10	   6715.7	   8204	   5348	   606.86	   0.090	   1.986	   0.4809	  
A12	   22273	   26194	   19079	   1873.3	   0.084	   1.756	   0.6289	  
A13	   5241.8	   11800	   3358	   2216	   0.423	   1.714	   0.5917	  




Table	  A4.1.	  Costa	  de	  Prata	  regression	  	  
(Notice	  that	  here	  the	  coefficient	  of	  urbanism,	  that	  is	  multiplied	  by	  the	  gdp,	  is	  2.0466)	  
Traffic	   Coef.	  
Robust	  std.	  
errors	  
t	   P>|t|	  
gdp	   528.725	   208.899	   2.63	   0.014	  
fuel_price	   -­‐16020.08	   6358.093	   -­‐2.52	   0.018	  
summer	   4515.295	   1315.936	   3.43	   0.002	  
const	   55754.69	   8238.844	   6.77	   0.000	  




















Table	  A5.1.	  Norte	  Litoral	  Regression	  	  
(Notice	  that	  here	  the	  coefficient	  of	  urbanism,	  which	  is	  multiplied	  by	  the	  gdp,	  is	  
2.0777)	  
Traffic	   Coef.	  
Robust	  std.	  
errors	  
t	   P>|t|	  
gdp	   70.8558	   105.0668	   0.505	   0.505	  
fuel_price	   -­‐2739.046	   3246.43	   -­‐0.84	   0.406	  
summer	   4742.547	   671.9142	   7.06	   0.000	  
const	   31022.45	   4206.737	   7.37	   0.000	  

























Table	  A6.1.	  Grande	  Porto	  regression	  
(Notice	  that	  here	  the	  coefficient	  of	  urbanism,	  which	  is	  multiplied	  by	  the	  gdp,	  is	  
2.4575)	  
Traffic	   Coef.	  
Robust	  std.	  
errors	  
t	   P>|t|	  
gdp	   115.3955	   85.2926	   1.35	   0.187	  
fuel_price	   -­‐8300.179	   3117.182	   -­‐2.66	   0.013	  
summer	   1924.159	   645.1638	   2.98	   0.006	  
const	   48981.75	   4039.258	   12.13	   0.000	  
	   R2=0.2928	  
	  
	  







































































Costa	  de	  Prata	   Norte	  Litoral	   Grande	  Porto	  

















Costa	  de	  Prata	   Norte	  Litoral	   Grande	  Porto	  
forecast	  2008-­‐2010	   real	  traffic	  2008-­‐2010	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